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8Introduction
On September 11, 2001, we suffered a horrible tragedy.  I myself lost a close 
family friend, a New York City Police Officer who lost his life saving the lives of others.  
As I struggled to make sense of what was going on around me I was struck by the amount 
of hatred and ignorance I saw Americans express towards those of Islamic origins.  I 
decided to set out in search of reasons for how people could feel such powerful hatred 
towards Americans that they would seek to cause the deaths of hundreds of thousands of 
people.  As Ali, the cousin of the Prophet Mohammed said, “You are the enemy of that 
which you do not know.”
Some of the questions that I began pondering were questions over the differences 
between American and Islamic culture.  Is there simply an inevitable gap between these 
cultures, which can only lead to catastrophe?  What is the appeal of fundamentalist Islam 
to people of my generation?  What is the appeal of fundamentalism in general?  It is these 
questions that I hope to answer in this paper.  
I would also like to examine the globalization of culture.  Globalization has come 
to be synonymous with Westernization and more importantly Americanization.  Along 
with American exports come American music, movies, television shows, and pop culture 
in general.  The question is whether this exportation of American culture is leading to a 
worldwide global convergence of culture or whether it is leading nations to rebel against 
it.  One can argue that the more and more prosperity a nation gains the more and more 
likely it will be to follow the American cultural example.  American culture is 
synonymous with success to many nations and thus it is easy to see how different 
countries would hope to emulate this culture.  However, along with cultural acceptance, 
9the world is seeing a rise in protectionist measures and ethnic conflicts.  There has been 
an increase in what is called “retribalization”, the retraditionalization of a people.  People 
who were once considered “modern” rediscover their local roots.  It is very difficult for 
people living in modern societies to imagine why a people would push for this move, but 
it is happening more and more often in the world.  
In the course of writing this thesis paper I will make a concerted effort to look at 
the issue as objectively as I can because I believe that cultural ethnocentrism is one of the 
leading factors in creating this conflict of beliefs.  
For the purposes of the paper I will be borrowing Amin Saikal’s definitions of 
“the West” and “Islam”.  The West 
“refers to those North American, West European and Australian democracies that 
have evolved and functioned as a somewhat coherent political and military 
alliance, under US leadership since the Second World War (especially when faced 
by a common threat), despite differences arising from identity, cultural, social and 
political diversity within the alliance that have often led to divergent foreign 
policy interest and approaches.”  
Islam 
“refers to all Arab and non-Arab followers of the religion of Islam, whether living 
in countries where Islam is the dominant religion or residing as minorities 
elsewhere.  It signifies a common broad religious affiliation, without denying the 
existence among Muslims of multiple interpretations of Islam and national 
political differences, which since Islam’s early centuries have rarely allowed 
Muslims to act in a unified fashion on the world stage.  Nor does it imply the 
absence of rivalries and conflicts, which have often marred relations among 
Muslim states in modern times.”1
I begin first by expounding the ideas of Samuel P. Huntington.  Huntington is a 
leading theorist on the issues facing Islam and the West in the new world order.  He was 
the first to coin the phrase “the clash of civilizations”.  In my next chapter I will discuss 
the principal criticisms of Huntington’s work drawing on the work of authors living in the 
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West as well as in the world of Islam.  I conclude the theoretical section in Chapter 3 by 
presenting my own ideas on the relationship between Islam and the West, hoping to 
prove that there is not necessarily an inevitable clash between the two.  In the second half 
of the paper I will apply my theoretical research to case studies of Algeria, Indonesia and 
Lebanon looking at these countries in order to see if there is a clash between Islam and 
the West in three different parts of the world.  
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Chapter 1: A Discussion of Samuel Huntington’s “The Clash of 
Civilizations?”
Samuel Huntington claims, “It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of 
conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic.  The 
great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be 
cultural.”2  He develops the concept of civilization as a blanket term to incorporate the 
largest amount of different cultures.  He provides the example of a village in Southern 
Italy sharing a common Italian culture with a Northern Italian village that in turn shares a 
common European culture.  This can be broadened all the way to a common Western 
culture. However, this culture cannot incorporate Arabs or Chinese so this thus 
constitutes a civilization.  He defines a civilization as “the highest cultural grouping of 
people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that which 
distinguishes humans from other species.”3  He identifies seven or eight major 
civilizations: Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin 
American and possibly African.4
Huntington traces world conflict through the centuries to show how conflict is 
evolving towards cultural conflict.  War has evolved from conflict between kings to 
conflict between peoples to conflict between ideologies (the Cold War).  All of these 
wars are labeled as Western civil wars as they all took place within the same civilization.  
He sees the new world conflict as occurring between the West and non-West as well as 
within the non-West.
He sees this clash as occurring for essentially six reasons.  The first is that there is 
a fundamental difference between civilizations.  They are differentiated by history, 
language, culture, tradition and religion.  They thus have different fundamental views of 
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the world, rights, responsibility, liberty, authority, equality, hierarchy, etc.  While 
Huntington does concede that differences do not necessarily lead to conflict, he sees the 
most prolonged and violent conflicts of the past as having occurred due to such 
differences.5
The second point that Huntington makes is that the world is becoming smaller and 
civilizations are interacting on an increasing basis.  “…These increasing interactions 
intensify civilization consciousness and awareness of differences between civilizations 
and commonalities within civilizations.”6  The more a civilization is presented with “the 
other”, the more it will be able to define itself in contrast to this other.  
Thirdly, Huntington sees economic modernization and social change as leading to 
fragmentation.  This is an argument that has been defended for years.  Economic change 
leads to rapid industrialization, which leads to rapid urbanization.  The cities, however, 
cannot support the population increase and thus people are subjected to abject poverty.  
There will be growing discontent among the masses and they will seek something to fill 
the void they are experiencing.  They seek an explanation for what is occurring in their 
lives.  
Huntington puts a new spin on this argument.  He claims that economic 
modernization and social change are weakening the nation-state as a source of identity as 
people are separating from longstanding local identities.  He cites religion as the 
increasingly popular alternative form of identification.  He also does not necessarily see 
the urban poor as being the people that are seeking to fill the void.  “In most countries 
and most religions the people active in fundamentalist movements are young, college-
educated, middle-class technicians, professionals and business persons.”7  Thus 
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Huntington is not proposing that it is the masses that are seeking change, but rather the 
middle and upper classes.  This is a more elitist movement initially.
Huntington cites the dual role of the West as being another factor leading to 
civilizational conflict.  The West is currently at the peak of its power.  At the same time 
the world is experiencing a massive rise in retribalization defined earlier as the 
retraditionalization of a people.  He points to the example of the re-Islamization of the 
Middle East in the wake of the failure of Western socialism and nationalism.8  He claims 
that the elites are the ones rediscovering their local roots while the masses are embracing 
American culture.  This is a shift from the past when it was the elite that sought to 
emulate American ways and the masses were the ones desperately clinging to local 
identity.  The irony is that while the West is at the peak of its power it is confronting non-
Western states, which increasingly have the desire and the means to shape the world in 
non-Western ways.
Benjamin Barber’s book Jihad v. McWorld draws on this concept.  He writes 
about the clash between American culture and local culture.  Barber sees Jihad as 
including characteristics of parochialism, antimodernism, exclusiveness, and hostility to 
“others”.9  McWorld is an all-inclusive body that is connected by the desire for profit and 
capitalism. Jihad and McWorld cannot exist independent of one another.  The drive for 
the maximization of profit leads to a change in priorities.  The more successful McWorld 
is the more defined Jihad will be.  The success of McWorld increases the resistance of 
Jihad.  The more Jihad resists, the more McWorld tries to get it to conform.  Thus a cycle 
of recrimination exists between these two forces.  Global citizens, however, must choose 
between Jihad and McWorld and thus the two cultures are in a state of constant conflict.10
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Fifthly, Huntington claims that cultural differences are less mutable and less 
easily compromised than political and economic differences.  He claims that communists 
could become democrats, the poor could become rich, but Russians cannot become 
Estonians.  In previous civilizational conflicts the main question was a question of what 
one believed.  This incorporated a certain amount of choice.  Today the question is “what 
are you?” which cannot be changed.  “Religion discriminates sharply and exclusively 
among people.”11  One can be half French and half Arab, but it is much more difficult to 
be half Catholic and half Muslim.
Finally, he attributes the coming clash of civilizations to the increase in economic 
regionalism.  He shows that regional cooperation is based upon inclusion in the same 
civilization.  He points to Japan as an example.  Japan cannot form a trade bloc because it 
is its own civilization onto itself.  In the post-Cold War era cultural commonalities are 
more important than ideological differences.12  For example, the People’s Republic of 
China and Singapore are both members of an East Asian economic bloc.  A communist 
government and an authoritarian government can cooperate in economic terms because 
they are both part of a larger civilization, which overcomes their ideological differences.
a. Islam’s Bloody Borders
Huntington believes that as people define their identity in religious and ethnic 
terms an “us versus them” mentality results.  There will be a clash at two levels.  At the 
micro level adjacent groups along the fault lines of civilizations will come into conflict 
over control of territory and each other.  On the macro level states in different 
civilizations will struggle for world power.
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He sees the West as having been in conflict with Islam for 1,300 years.  The 
Muslim South is generally less advanced economically and less likely to develop stable 
democratic political systems.13  Post World War II, the former European colonial powers 
lost control over their empires and a rise in Arab nationalism ensued.  This led to 
openings in the Arab political systems.  Huntington sees these openings as having 
provided room for Islamist movements.  He feels that Western democracy strengthens 
anti-Western political forces.  Thus Arab nationalism then led to further Islamic 
fundamentalism, as Benjamin Barber mentions.  
Huntington claims that both sides see this clash.  He cites an Indian Muslim 
author, M.J. Akhbar, who writes, “[The West’s] next confrontation is definitely going to 
come from the Muslim world.  It is in the sweep of the Islamic nations from Maghreb to 
Pakistan that the struggle for a new world order will begin.”14
Islam, however, not only clashes with the West but also clashes with the pagan, 
animist and increasingly Christian African civilization.  Islam also clashes with the 
Orthodox civilization.  He points to the conflicts in Bosnia, Bulgaria, between the 
Armenians and Azeris, and Russia and Central Asia as examples of this point.15  There is 
also a clash with the Hindu civilization as manifested in the struggle between Pakistan 
and India and even within India as it struggles against its Muslim minority.  China 
pursues a ruthless policy towards its Turkic- Muslim minority.  Essentially all of this 
points to the fact that “Islam has bloody borders”, a claim which has offended many 
scholars.16
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b. “Kin-Country Syndrome”
H.D.S. Greenway coined the term “kin-country syndrome” as a representation for 
civilizational commonality.  Huntington sees the “kin-country syndrome” as replacing 
political ideology and traditional balance of power considerations as the basis for 
international cooperation and coalitions.17  He uses the Gulf War as an example.  He 
claims that many Arab elites quietly cheered on Saddam Hussein.  Hussein even framed 
his struggle in religious terms as a struggle of Islam versus the West.  His Arab kindred 
bought the message.  “It is not the world against Iraq, it is the West against Islam,” wrote 
Safar Al-Hawali, dean of Islamic Studies at the Umm Al-Qura University in Mecca.18
Even the Ayatollah Khomeini, a traditional enemy of Iraq, called for a holy war against 
the West.  “The struggle against American aggression, greed, plans and policies will be 
counted as a jihad, and anybody who is killed on that path is a martyr,” he proclaimed.19
King Hussein of Jordan proclaimed that it was not only a war against Iraq, but also a war 
against all Arabs and all Muslims.20  Even those Arab nations that had supported the 
West in its actions began to withdraw their support.  They were not stringent in enforcing 
the no-fly zone over Iraq in 1992 and opposed the bombings of Iraq in 1993. 
Huntington also uses the former Yugoslavia as an example of the kin-country 
syndrome.  He points out that the first nations to recognize Slovenia and Croatia, as 
legitimate states, were their co-religionists, the Vatican, the European Union and the 
United States.  Russia supported its ethnic brethren the Serbs.  Islamic governments 
turned against the West for not supporting the Bosnian Muslims.  Muslims sent their own 
support to the Bosnians in the form of up to 4,000 men from over two-dozen countries, 
notably Iran and Lebanon.  Saudi Arabia experienced pressure from its fundamentalist 
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population and thus sent funding to the Muslim soldiers.  He paralleled this situation to 
the Spanish civil war of the 1930s that attracted fascist, communist and democratic 
support just as Bosnia attracted Muslim, Orthodox and Western Christian responses.  
This is thus further proof of the shift of civilizational change from politics to culture.
From the kin-country syndrome Huntington extrapolates, “Common membership 
in a civilization reduces the probability of violence in situations where it might otherwise 
occur.”21  He concludes that conflicts within civilizations are less likely.  Thus “The next 
world war, if there is one, will be a war between civilizations.”22
c. The West and The Rest
The West is unrivaled in world power militarily and economically. It dominates 
the United Nations and the International Monetary Fund.  It is using its power to run 
international organizations and produce a world order that supports the dominance of the 
West.  He claims that Western ideas of individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, 
human rights, equality, liberty, the rule of law, democracy, free markets, and the 
separation of church and state often have little importance in other cultures.  He quotes 
the author of a review of 100 comparative studies of values in different societies who 
claims, “The values that are most important in the West are least important worldwide.”23
Western powers attempt to get other nations to become democratic and support human 
rights, but this is viewed as a new means of Western imperialism, a new colonialism.  
The support of fundamentalism by younger generations in the non-West is a reaction 
against this spread of Western culture or “human rights imperialism” as Huntington calls 
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it.  The claim of a universal world culture is a Western concept in Huntington’s opinion, 
first set out by German philosopher Emmanuel Kant.  
The next conflict in the world is likely to be between the West and “the Rest”.  
Non-Western nations can follow one or a combination of the following three methods: 
isolation, bandwagoning, or balance.  Pursing isolation poses a high risk to nations and is 
only really being followed by North Korea and Burma.  If a nation decides to 
“bandwagon” it joins the West and accepts its values and institutions.  In seeking balance 
nations develop economic and military power and cooperate with non-Western nations 
against Western nations.  In other words they modernize without Westernizing.
d. The Islamic-Confucian Connection
Huntington sees the Islamic-Confucian connection as indicative of nations 
attempting to pursue the “balance” objective.  He discusses their military buildup as a 
means of gaining power.  While the United States and Russia are reducing their military 
power China, North Korea and the Middle East are significantly expanding their military 
capabilities.  This leads to the emergence of “weapons states” which are non-Western.  
Arms control is a Western concept.  The West is attempting to prevent the development 
by non-Western societies of military capabilities that could threaten Western interests.  In 
the disarmament debate the non-Western states claim that they need weapons for their 
own security.  Nuclear weapons, chemical weapons and missiles are seen as the great 
equalizers.  A top Iranian official declared that all Muslim states should acquire nuclear 
weapons.  As Huntington wrote, “The conflict between the West and the Islamic-
Confucian states focuses largely, although not exclusively, on nuclear, chemical and 
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biological weapons, ballistic missiles, and other sophisticated means for delivering them, 
and the guidance intelligence and other electronic capabilities for achieving that goal.”24
Huntington discusses the arms trade between East Asia and the Middle East.  He 
claims that the Islamic-Confucian connection was forged with the exportation of weapons 
technology from nations such as China and North Korea to Muslim nations such as Iran, 
Iraq, Libya, Algeria, and Syria.  The connection is designed to promote the acquisition of 
military power for member states in order to combat the military power of the West.  He 
sees a new arms race in which one side is building up arms and the other is attempting to 
limit and prevent arms build-up while reducing its own stock.25
e. Conclusions
Huntington wants to make clear that he is not claiming that the nation-state 
disappears, nor is he claiming that there will never be conflict within a civilization.  
Rather he wants to stress that the differences between civilizations are real and important.  
They will supplant ideological and other types of conflict as the dominant form.  He 
predicts that international relations will become de-Westernized.  Non-Western states 
will become actors and not merely objects in the new world order.  Successful institutions 
will be much more likely to develop within civilizations.  The paramount axis of world 
power will be “the West and the Rest”.  The central focus for the West in the immediate 
future should be the Islamic-Confucian connection.  
In the short-run, Western policy goals should be to promote grater unity and 
cooperation within the West, focusing on uniting Europe and North America.  The West 
should also focus on incorporating the Eastern European and Latin American 
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civilizations, as they are very similar in culture.  Greater cooperation with Russia and 
Japan should be emphasized.  The escalation of local inter-civilizational conflicts into 
major global inter-civilizational wars should be prevented at all costs.  The West should 
seek to limit the expansion of military power in the Islamic-Confucian connection.  It 
should moderate the reduction of weapons and focus on maintaining superiority in East 
and Southwest Asia.  It should seek to exploit the differences and conflicts among 
Islamic and Confucian states so as to weaken this threatening connection.  The West 
should support groups in other civilizations that are sympathetic to its culture.  Finally, it 
must strengthen the international institutions that support Western ideas and involve non-
Western actors in these organizations.
In the long run, the West should seek to maintain the economic and military 
power necessary to protect its interests against rising non-Western actors.  It should seek 
a greater understanding of the basic religious and philosophical values underpinning 
other civilizations and identify a commonality between the West and other civilizations.  
There will be no universal civilization but a world of different civilizations that must 
coexist.26
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Chapter 2: Reponses to Samuel Huntington
Samuel Huntington’s work has created much controversy. Since September 11th, 
it has gained increasing attention and increasing criticism.  In this next chapter I will 
examine the work of Huntington’s critics.  I will look at six of the main arguments 
against his work: his misinterpretation of Bosnia, misinterpretation of the Gulf War, 
misinterpretation of the arms trade, underestimation of the role of the middle class, and 
finally his overestimation of the cohesiveness of culture.
a. Misinterpretation of Bosnia
Critics point out that the Bosnian crisis was not simply a religious war among 
Orthodox Christian Serbs, Catholic Croats and Muslim Bosnians supported by 
coreligionists.  Chandra Muzaffar claims that unjust power structures left over from the 
former Yugoslavia were the major contributing factor in the conflict.  Serbs dominated 
the political and military aspects of the former Yugoslavia, but the economy, industry and 
sciences were dominated by Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Non-Serbs saw 
themselves as second-class citizens, and Serbian chauvinism led to conflict.  Once Tito 
left, the balancing act among nationalities was bound to come apart.  Serbia had a 
measure of hegemony in the old system but with the coming privatization and economic 
reform the Serbs were less confident about their hold on power.  The citizens of Sarajevo, 
the Croats and Slovenes all had a head start in the new economy compared with the rural 
Serbs.  The Serbs thus had to “hack at the new order with desperate abandon.”27
Jeane J. Kirkpatrick also argues that viewing the Bosnian crisis in religious terms 
is an oversimplification.  She points out that Serbian forces began the offensive against 
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Croatia and Slovenia showing that their goal was territorial aggrandizement and not holy 
war. 28
Muzaffar argues that the outside forces were motivated by geopolitical 
Machiavellian concerns.  Britain needed Serbia as a counter-weight to Germany.  Great 
Britain, and to a lesser degree France, felt that a unified Germany posed a threat to the 
balance of power in Europe.  The United States was reluctant to join in the conflagration 
because it had no stake in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  It also did not want to jeopardize its 
“special relationship” with Great Britain.29  Amit Gupta goes on to claim that the 
majority of Western opinion was concerned with the welfare of Bosnian Muslims, a fact 
that Huntington does not acknowledge.30
Fouad Ajami claims that Huntington overemphasized the role of Muslim 
volunteers in Bosnia as indicative of the kin-country syndrome.  He claims that there 
never was a Muslim cavalry coming.  The Iranians called for a holy war, but there was no 
real action.  The United States had to become involved in order to stop the Serbs.31  Most 
governments of predominately Muslim states were reluctant to treat Bosnia as a religious 
war.  The Bosnian government even resisted the temptation to paint the situation as Islam 
versus a Judeo-Christian world.32
Muzaffar concludes that the Serbs who tried to frame the situation in terms of 
Orthodox Christianity being under siege from Islamic fundamentalism, and the Muslims 
elsewhere who saw the lack of Western action as a result of religious differences, are 
guilty of oversimplifying the situation.33  One can extrapolate from this that Huntington is 
guilty of the same crime.
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b. Misinterpretation of the Gulf War
Ajami argues that Huntington buys Saddam Hussein’s interpretation of the Gulf 
War. 34  Kuwait pitted one non-Western Muslim government against another.  The United 
States and other Western governments became involved for geopolitical reasons that 
transcended cultural differences.  It really was about restoring the balance of power in an 
unstable region.  The American presence had the anxious consent of the Arab lands of the 
Persian Gulf.  Most Arab governments rallied to save Kuwait rather than allied with 
Iraq.35  Saudi, Turkish, Egyptian, and Syrian forces supported the Western forces.  
The general public cheered on Hussein but did little else.  There were no popular 
uprisings in the Middle East.  International terror dealt no blows on behalf of Iraq.36
After the United States mobilized, Saddam took to public prayers and appeals for 
solidarity to the Muslim world.  When Saddam’s dream of hegemony was shattered he 
fell back on the rhetoric of Ayatollah Khomeini.  Previously he had been a secular leader 
who had devastated the ulamma.  He had a Christian Prime Minister, Tariq Aziz.  He had 
warned of the dangers of the Iranian regime and prided himself on his secular regime.  
Ten days after Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, Saudi Arabia’s highest religious 
body, the Council of Higher Ulamma, issued a fatwa supporting the presence of Arab, 
Islamic and “other friendly forces”.  “All means of defense, the ulamma ruled, were 
legitimate to guarantee the people ‘the safety of their religion, their wealth, and their 
honor and their blood, to protect what they enjoy of safety and stability’.”37
Huntington quotes Safar al Hawali (a religious radical at Umm al Qura University 
in Mecca) as claiming that the campaign against Iraq was a Western campaign against 
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Islam.  Ajami, however, points out that among the ulamma class and religious scholars in 
Saudi Arabia al Hawali was considered a loner and “a crank”.38
The leading Egyptian religious figure, Shaykh of Al Ashar Shaykh Jadd al Haqq, 
denounced Saddam as a tyrant and brushed aside his Islamic pretenses as a cover for 
tyranny.  Iran’s rulers sat out the war, as they would be the principle beneficiaries of 
Iraq’s defeat.  Their major rival in the region would be defeated.39
Essentially, “The fight in the Gulf was seen for what it was: a bid for primacy met 
by an imperial expedition that laid it to waste.”40  The Gulf War was not about religion 
but rather about the geopolitical balance of power in an unstable region.  As in the case of 
Bosnia, Huntington again skews a situation in order to fit his civilizational paradigm.
c. Misinterpretation of the Arms Trade
Huntington writes, “A Confucian-Islamic military connection has thus come into 
being, designed to promote acquisition by its members of the weapons and the weapons 
technology needed to counter the military power of the West.”41  Ajami claims that arms 
trafficking between China, North Korea and the Middle East is done for purely selfish 
purposes.  It is the commerce of renegades, plain piracy, an underground economy.  
These nations are merely picking up the slack left by the great arms suppliers, the United 
States, Russia, Great Britain and France.  States will consort with any civilization, 
however alien, as long as the price is right and goods are readily available.42
Huntington is further criticized for having failed to recognize that the United 
States is still by far the largest supplier of weapons to the entire Arab world and Israel.43
The United States is the number one arms supplier in the world.  In 1991, the United 
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States supplied $59 billion to the South, an increase of $25 billion from 1989.44  Most 
Muslim countries buy their weapons from the United States, not from China.  At the end 
of 1990, the United States signed a $21 billion contract with Saudi Arabia, which allowed 
the latter to buy a range of sophisticated weapons.  In 1991, Kuwait signed a 10-year 
defense treaty with the US. 45  At the same time Iran has consistently decreased its 
military budget since the Iran-Iraq war and now has the lowest military budget in the 
region.46  American arms sales to Saudi Arabia are the same as the Chinese arms sales to 
Iran, opportunistic moves based not on national empathy or civilizational alliances.  
On many issues the Chinese have failed to support the Muslim interests such as 
the Bosnia-Herzegovina situation, the United Nations Zionism vote of 1991, and the 
recognition of Israel in 1991.47  China voted against UN action in Iraq and Libya because 
of fear that the United Nations could be used against it in the same way thus undermining 
its own sovereignty.48
The reality is that China has been moving closer to the West over the past twenty 
years.  The Middle East has had trouble modernizing while East and Southeast Asia have 
been booming economically speaking.  In reality East and Southeast Asia are more 
similar to the West than they are to the Islamic civilization.49  In seeking to modernize 
their economies these nations need the help of Western technology and know-how.
Many critics argue the threat is not of an Iraqi, Iranian or North Korean strike on 
Western cities, but rather that the West will no longer be able to intervene in regional 
conflicts in the third world because of rising costs due to increasing nuclear weapons 
proliferation.  As former US Secretary of Defense Les Aspin says, “Weapons of mass 
destruction may directly threaten our forces in the field, and in a more subtle way 
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threaten the effective use of those forces.”50  The Islamic-Confucian connection is not the 
problem, the loss of Western hegemonic power is.
d. Underestimation of the Role of the Middle Class
Democracy has spread rapidly throughout Latin America, the former communist 
bloc, Africa and Asia.  A 1993 Freedom House report claims that there are 75 free 
nations, up from 55 a decade earlier.  In 1993, only 31% of the world’s population (most 
of whom live in China) was living under repressive regimes, down from 44% in 1983.51
Above per capita figures of $5,500 nearly all nations are democratic (Freedom House 
rankings). The exceptions being medieval oil sheikhdoms and some Asian tigers, such as 
Singapore.52  Economic development leads to an increase in demands for democracy and 
individual/familial autonomy. 53   Development creates a middle class that wants a say in 
its own future.  The middle class cares about the progress and freedom of its sons and 
daughters.  Further economic progress then depends principally on the middle class.  
They are traditionally the ones that drive for further education and put their creative 
abilities towards the good of the economy.  “A resourceful middle class partakes of 
global culture and norms.”54  Citing Barber, it is the internationalized middle class whose 
tastes and preferences are those of the American middle class.  This is in opposition to 
Huntington who claims, “In most countries and most religions the people active in 
fundamentalist movements are young, college-educated, middle-class technicians, 
professionals and business persons.”55  Economic globalization leads to cultural 
globalization.  The drive for the maximization of profit leads to changes in priorities.   
The middle class serves to defend the status quo in order to keep power.  This leads to 
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increased state stability.  In the early stages of development ruling elites can forge 
accommodation with the middle class especially if local military authority is dealt into 
action.  Continued progress, however, depends on gradual accommodation with the 
democratic middle class.  Thus the middle class can only be suppressed at the expense of 
progress.56
Instant worldwide communications reduce the power of oppressive governments 
while at the same time serving to further homogenize global tastes and preferences.57
Thus the globalization of information helps to support cultural globalization that in turn 
affects the increase in global democracy.  
All of this bodes well for world order, as democracies do not tend to go to war 
with each other.  The spread of democratic states diminishes the potential for conflict.  
Nations would rather scramble for market shares, compete in the world economy, provide 
jobs and move out of poverty than battle for civilizational ties.  Unlike Huntington who 
sees the middle class as a breeding ground for retraditionalization and fundamentalism, 
the middle class is viewed as the impetus for global homogenization.
e. Overestimation of the Cohesiveness of Cultures
Abdul Kalam argues that Huntington misrepresents Islam in order to fit his 
paradigmatic model.58  The Muslim world encompasses over fifty nation-states, thus it is 
unrealistic to expect the world of Islam to be monolithic.  Huntington does admit that the 
Islamic civilization can be divided into the Turkic, Arab and Malay subdivisions.  He, 
however, ignores the South Asian Indo-Islamic subdivision, which encompasses around 
300,000,000 Muslims.  There are strong divisions in the Islamic civilization around 
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national, racial and cultural lines.  South Asian Muslims historically have been 
discriminated against and victimized when they come to work in Saudi Arabia, Iraq and 
Iran, for example.  On political issues these nations do not always agree.  Even on the 
issue of Israel there is considerable divisiveness.  The Israel-PLO peace accord received 
many different reactions in the Muslim community.  In the late 1970s and early 1980s 
Saudi Arabia, a country known for supporting Islamic causes globally, prevented the 
second oil crisis from escalating and hurting Western economies by pumping large 
quantities of oil. 
The term “Islam has bloody borders” is offensive to many authors.  Paul Y. 
Hammond argues that Huntington takes the exception of militant Islam or Islamic 
fundamentalism and applies it as the norm for the rest of Islamic culture.59  These cases 
are extreme and exceptional; they are not the norm.  The first target of Islamic 
fundamentalists is not another civilization, but their own governments.  Jeane Kirkpatrick 
quotes a deeply religious Muslim friend who said to her, “”Please do not call them 
Muslim fundamentalists.  They do not represent a more fundamental version of the 
Muslim religion.  They are simply Muslims who are also violent political extremists.”60
There are, in fact, far more intracivilizational battles than there are intercivilizational 
battles.  All over the world there are instances of Muslims killing other Muslims: 
Afghanistan’s civil war, Algeria’s civil conflict, Turkey’s actions against the Kurds, the 
Islamic insurrection in Egypt, and Karachi, Pakistan.  Intracivilizationally, Muslims kill 
each other more often than they kill non-Muslims.61  Furthermore in all conflicts between 
Muslims and pro-Western forces the Muslims are losing.  One can look at the Azeris, 
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Palestinians, Iraqis, Iranians or Bosnian Muslims as examples.  With so much disunity in 
the Muslim world these forces are not about to coalesce into a single force.
“The phenomenon we have dubbed as Islamic fundamentalism is less a sign of 
resurgence than of panic and bewilderment and guilt that the border with ‘the other’ has 
been crossed.”62  There is a strange mixture of attraction and repulsion to the West on 
behalf of fundamentalist Muslims.  While they come to the West seeking liberty and 
work, they preach against the sins of the West.  It is an interesting paradox.
While there was some political mobilization along religious lines at the end of the 
Cold War in the vacuum of power, most action took place along ethno-nationalistic lines.  
The former Soviet republics, for example, rediscovered their ethnic nationalities.  The 
breakdown of the state system created by European colonial powers was frozen under the 
superpower rivalry for fifty years.  Today it is finally taking place in an international 
setting with high cross-cultural interaction.  Ideas are transmitted and appropriated across 
these boundaries.  One has the ability to instantly communicate.  One can watch world 
events in real-time.  The world economies are linked by the twenty-four hour schedule of 
financial markets.  The civilizational agenda is thus diluted in today’s world. 
Edward Said argues that one of the greatest advances of modern cultural theory is 
the realization that “cultures are hybrid and heterogeneous and…that cultures and 
civilizations are so interrelated and interdependent as to beggar unitary...delineated 
description.”63
Chaibong Hahm argues that there is only a clash between civilizations if one 
views “identity politics” as being more important than “politics of practice”.64  According 
to Hahm culture is not purely biological, but rather a combination of biology and 
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acculturation.  It is wrong to assume that culture predetermines one’s desires and political 
choices.  Hahm stresses common practices and institutions not broad ideas that appear to 
be universal but in fact become divisive.  He champions a way to harmonize individual 
and group behavior while leaving one’s inner-life to oneself.
One must deconstruct the modern definition of culture that Huntington uses.  One 
should turn more to a Confucian view of culture in which culture is nothing more than a 
concrete set of practices and institutions.  By following Confucius’ example and judging 
people on what they do rather than who they are one can overcome identity politics.65
The goal of Confucianism is to preserve and transmit culture by acting or speaking in a 
certain manner in everyday contexts and situations.66  One needs to look at cultures and 
use empirical verification through the techniques of social, economic and political 
pluralism in order to cope with conflict and promote cooperation.
g. Conclusions
The rediscovery of identity through transnational links does not mean that the 
nation-state is breaking down.  The cultural and religious glue that is meant to hold 
civilizations together is thin and cracked.  Nation-states’ political regimes are what 
provide people with their principle bonds.  Civilizations do not control states; states 
control civilizations.  States can avert blood-ties when necessary and can see brotherhood 
when it is in their interest to do so.  The solitude of states continues.  Essentially,
Huntington is too broad with his definition of civilizational conflict.  The conflict could 
be just as much racial as it is cultural.  The main lines of conflict could be economic or 
state blocs.  He places a lot of credence in retribalization, underestimating the tenacity of 
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modernity and secularism.  Traditionalists are more often vocal when their traditions 
rupture.  He projects Islam as a “militant religion”, but it seems as if the victim is the one 
who is blamed in this scenario.  Struggle in the Middle East can be seen as a result of the 
unfulfilled quest for self-determination and genuine independence and sovereignty.  The 
essence of these struggles resonates with all cultures.  In the case of Palestine and 
Lebanon, the struggle is about the opposition to the annexation of land.  Saudi Arabia and 
the gulf sheikhdoms are struggling against the usurpation of their rights over their own 
natural resources.  All Muslim nations oppose the vilification of their religion by the 
mainstream Western media.  They have been fighting against the powerful force of 
Western imperialism aided by local elites.
Civilizations embody many similar values and ideals.  On a philosophical level 
religions share common perspectives on matters such as the relationship between human 
beings and the environment, the integrity of the community, the importance of the family, 
the significance of moral leadership and the meaning and purpose of life.
Washington DC, under the Clinton administration, developed the “Clinton 
doctrine”, which essentially stated that Islam is not a threat to American interests or to the 
West.   President Clinton himself said, “America refuses to accept that our civilizations 
must collide.”67  Historically there has been a reciprocal relationship between America 
and the Middle East.  The coalition against Iraq was supported by many Muslim nations.  
The Saudis, who can be considered as fundamentalist as any nation, are a key US ally.  
Indonesia and Bangladesh are both considered close “non-formal” allies.  Turkey, 
Pakistan and Egypt are also very important allies.  In the case of Bosnia, the United 
States was more sympathetic to the Muslim people than the Europeans were.
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Joseph Nye Jr. suggests that the ethnic openness of American culture coupled 
with the political appeal of the American values of democracy and human rights serve as 
definite sources of strength for global leadership and international influence.68   Thus the 
United States is bound to lead the world in the foreseeable future.  If the United States 
follows the paradigm approach it may lead to isolation and alienation.
It is also important to note that Western culture is coming apart.  Budget 
discipline is disappearing.  Social programs are multiplying with little heed to costs.  Low 
savings and investment rates lead to decreased competition with the rising economies of 
East Asia.  The work ethic is eroding.  The West is also lacking effective leadership.  The 
United States cannot even get France to agree with it on foreign policy matters.  
Individualism is coming at a price.  Since 1960, the US population has increased by 41% 
while violent crime has increased by 560%, single mother births by 419%, divorce rates 
by 3000% and the number of children living in single parent homes 300%.69  Essentially 
the West is bringing its relative decline by its own hand.
There has been a global upsurge of interest in cultural, ethnic and religious values, 
notably but not solely, Islamic fundamentalism.  Worldwide there has been an increase in 
fundamentalism in all world religions: Protestantism, Catholicism, Judaism, Hinduism, 
Sikhism, and even Buddhism.  These movements are occurring in the East as well as in 
the West.  For example, fundamentalist Protestantism has risen in popularity in the 
United States since the 1970s.  Appalled by the “moral and social crises” of the 1960s, 
the rise of the drug culture, the US Supreme Court decisions to ban prayer in public 
schools and in favor of abortion (to name a few), Reverend Jerry Falwell and his religious 
associates in the Religious Roundtable and other Christian Right lobbying groups began a 
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fight to save the next generation of Christians.  Reverend Pat Robertson’s Christian 
Coalition continued the fundamentalist movement beginning a second wave of 
fundamentalism in the late 1980s and 1990s.  The Christian Right continues to make its 
presence felt in US politics particularly with regard to the abortion debate.70
There has also been a rise in Jewish fundamentalism, such as the Kach movement 
of the United States and Israel.  The movement started in response to the rise of black 
militancy in the United Sates in the 1960s.  It gained the early support of lower-middle 
class Jews in large metropolitan areas, mostly New York.  Led by Rabbi Meir Kahane, 
the movement practiced Jewish inclusiveness and empowerment while adopting a 
confrontational attitude towards all Gentiles.  Kahane transplanted the movement to Israel 
in the 1970s again attracting Jews in the poorer quarters of big cities.  He drew on the 
competition between poor Jews and Arabs in the job market in order to gain a greater 
following.  The movement continues to preach hostility between Arabs and Jews in 
Israel.71
In spite of this increase in fundamentalism, there are also powerful integrationist 
tendencies at work.  Mullahs are against the decadence of the West, but the Muslim 
people also see a need for progress.  In the new era the goal should be to strike a balance 
between realpolitik and moralism.  In the information age dominated by person-to-person 
contact policy is edging towards the moralistic Wilsonian pole.  However, one cannot 
ignore military power.  There is a need for human rights policy but this must be balanced 
with the Islamic fundamentalist minority of Turkey and Egypt, which would surely rebel.  
As Kalam suggests, the focus of future policy should be “to promote a new cultural 
dynamic: the culture of peace and culture of development.”72  The West should stop 
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being forceful and help the third world to develop.  We must bury the concept of 
civilizational conflict and work together to create a new universal civilization of 
mankind.
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Chapter 3: My Theory
Now that we have explored Huntington’s theory of the clash of civilizations as 
well as the theorists who disagree with his analysis, where are we left?  In this chapter I 
would like to expound my own ideas on the topic.  I agree with the theorists that 
Huntington’s view of an inevitable clash is too simplistic.  I do not feel that these two 
civilizations must inevitably come to a head, but rather that the current conflict between 
the Muslim nations and the United States, in particular, is due to the negative portrayal of 
Islam in the Western media, the United States’ foreign policy decisions, especially in 
regard to the Palestine issue, as well as the lack of democracy in these Arab nations 
leading to a lack of common ground on which to negotiate.  I begin with a background of 
Islam: its relationship with Christianity and Judaism, and the Sunni-Shia division.  Then I 
discuss the current situation facing both the Muslim world and US foreign policymakers, 
highlighting the generational gaps.  Next I discuss US foreign policy towards the Muslim 
world giving a brief analysis of the differences between President Clinton’s and President 
George W. Bush’s policies.  Then I specifically highlight the Palestine issue as indicative 
of a huge gap between the West and the Muslim world.  Finally, I explore the role of 
Western media in turning Muslims against the West and its exploitation by Islamic 
fundamentalists.  I conclude that it is these factors, and not an inevitable culture clash, 
that have led to tensions between the West and the world of Islam.  I maintain that the 
United States should focus on alleviating the negative impacts of modernization on the 
Islamic nations in order to help foster better cooperation and communication.
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a. Islam with Christianity and Judaism
Islam is viewed not only as a theology, but also as a sociology as it incorporates 
particular social practices in culture, manners, food and language.  Mohammed was 
viewed as a civil and military governor of Medina.  Religion ruled the state and the 
Prophet was a military commander as opposed to Christ who said, “Give onto Caesar 
what is Caesar’s and onto God what is God’s.” Thus there is no separation of Church and 
state in Islam, which frightens the West.  Westerners feel that the governments of Muslim 
nations are entirely ruled by a religion that tells them to fight against the “non-believers”.  
The West tends to view all the Muslim nations as being the same as they are dominated 
by the same religion.  However, there are many differences in Muslim nations.  In fact, 
there is no central doctrine in Islam.  There are no ordained preachers or ulamma.  Any 
alim can issue a fatwa.  The madrassas can preach whatever they feel constitutes Islam.  
The power of the leader thus derives from the number of people who put credence in his 
views.
There is no particular interpretation of sharia (Islamic law) that is universal in the 
world of Islam.  Thus there are different interpretations of jihad.  There are basically two 
types of jihad: greater jihad, which is a personal spiritual struggle, and lesser jihad, which 
is a warfare form of struggle.  It is the latter form that has gained recent attention.  The 
warfare form of struggle is meant to be defensive, protecting the Islamic community 
when it is threatened or invaded.  In a Muslim community ruled by non-Muslims a jihad 
is only allowed when the Muslim community is being suppressed.  This does not mean 
that everyone should become a suicide bomber.  Abdul Aziz ibn Abdullah al Shaikh, the 
grand mufti of Saudi Arabia, four months before September 11, 2001, declared that 
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suicide bombers were not martyrs for Islam but rather guilty of committing suicide which 
is prohibited in Islamic law.73  Mohammed al Tabari, a ninth-century scholar, understood 
the verse “And fight in the way of God those who fight you, but transgress not: God loves 
not the transgressors (2:187)”, ascribed to the Prophet Mohammed, to mean, “one should 
never fight women, children, the elderly or the one who offers peace and restrains his 
hand.”74
General Pervez Musharraf declared, “Islam teaches tolerance, not hatred; 
universal brotherhood, not enmity; peace, not violence.”75  The Qur’an teaches that all 
religions are members of society.  In the Qur’an the umma can refer specifically to the 
community of believers, but it can also be extended to the entire world thus making the 
covenant of Islam inclusive to all of the world and even the universe or universes.  Islam 
has a history of being tolerant of all religions when its empire is secure.  Unlike 
Christianity and Judaism it evolved in a world where it was the dominant religion and 
thus there was no need for struggle and uncertainty.  Surah 109: verse 6 of the Qur’an 
specifically says “To you your religion and to me mine”.  The Qur’an goes out of its way 
to ensure that special respect and treatment is given to the “People of the Book”, Jews 
and Christians.  There is a special relationship between all of these religions because the 
Prophet Mohammed is said to be a prophet in a long line of prophets deriving from 
Judaism and Christianity.
Sunni v. Shia
It is important to realize that there is a great divide in the world of Islam between 
the Sunni and Shiite factions.  The Shia are the more radical of two, yet make up a 
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smaller proportion of the population. Sunnis make up approximately ninety percent of the 
Muslim population while Shia account for only ten percent.  The Shia are prevalent in 
Iran, Southern Iraq and South Asia.  Their sect focuses on Ali as the first legitimate 
caliph as he followed from the Prophet’s bloodline.  They believe in the cult of 
martyrdom because all but one out of the first twelve caliphs was murdered.
To Sunnis the early history of Islam is dominated by success while the Shia see it 
as being a history of struggle and sacrifice.  They have a deep mistrust of arbitration 
dating back from the days of the Qur’an.  
While there are no priests in Islam, the Shia have Sayeds thus creating a hierarchy 
of leaders in Iran and South Asia but not the Middle East.  Sunnis feel that God and 
humans have a direct relationship while the Shia believe intercession is a key part of the 
divine plan for salvation.  In the Shiite sect leaders can interpret the Qur’an while Sunni 
leaders cannot.  Shia feel that God is guiding their leaders and thus they are sinless and 
infallible while the Sunnis feel that their leaders can be fallible.  The Sunnis thus view the 
caliph as a political leader while the Shia see him as a religious leader.  
In Islam there is a tension between ijtihad, which believes in a personal 
interpretation of the Qur’an, and taqlid, which believes in following the example of 
previous ulammas.  This reflects the divide between Sunni and Shia.  
Summary
Islamic fundamentalism calls for a return to sharia and a creative interpretation of 
the law.  It is important to remember that fundamentalist movements are developing in all 
religions.  Fundamentalists of any religion are very similar in their beliefs and tactics.  
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For example, the bombing of abortion clinics in America by Christian fundamentalists is 
very similar to the suicide attacks perpetrated by Islamic fundamentalists.  Thus the West 
need not fear the religion of Islam, but rather should look towards dealing with all those 
who are adhering to any form of fundamentalism.  Oftentimes the Western media 
portrays the beliefs of the Shiite sect as being the beliefs of all followers of Islam.  The 
Shia, however, only account for a relatively small portion of the population.  It is also 
important to remember that because a person is a Shiite does not necessarily mean that he 
is an Islamic fundamentalist.  The majority of the world’s 1.25 billion Muslims is peace 
loving and believes in the brotherhood of the People of the Book.  They conduct jihad 
against their own personal bad habits rather than jihad against the West.
b. The Generational Split
The Muslim World
It is important to remember that a generation or two ago, Muslim countries were 
ruled by Western imperialist powers, and that many of these societies were deprived of 
basic modern amenities.  Many Muslim nations have been struggling for sovereignty 
since as late as the 1960s.  The baby-boomer generation thus grew up in an age where 
they were struggling against Western imperialist powers for national freedom, in the 
same way that the United States had struggled for freedom in 1776.  As many political 
science scholars contend, once a nation has gained independence there is a period of 
chaos and uncertainty as the government attempts to organize itself and lead its people 
towards their common future.  As the government attempts to modernize there is a rapid 
increase in urbanization.  This urbanization leads to a displacement of a large portion of 
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the population as they find themselves without work.  The exploitation of the population 
by modernization leads many people living in Muslim countries to turn to religion to fill 
this gap.  The population turns to fundamentalism as a way to organize their chaotic lives.  
As Dilip Hiro argues in his book War Without End: The Rise of Islamist Terror and 
Global Response, “Today the alienated class of recent migrants to cities from villages 
provides the popular backing for the fundamentalist movement which is led mainly by 
low- and medium-ranking clerics and pious professionals and traders.”76 Religion 
provides them with a sense of belonging and direction.  The rise to power of the 
Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran is a perfect example of this.  The population was suffering 
under Shah Pahlavi’s attempts to modernize and thus turned to a fundamentalist Islamic 
regime to lead them.  The 1991 election in which the FIS (Islamic Salvation Front) in 
Algeria was poised to win is also an example of this phenomenon, which will be 
discussed later in this paper.
The UNDP’s Arab Human Development Report 2002 claims, 
“There is a substantial lag between Arab countries and other regions in terms of 
participatory governance.  The wave of democracy, which transformed 
governance in most of Latin America and East Asia in the 1980s, and Eastern 
Europe and much of Central Asia in the late 1980s and early 1990s, has barely 
reached the Arab states.  This freedom deficit undermines human development 
and is one of the most painful manifestations of lagging political development.  
While de jure acceptance of democracy and human rights is enshrined in 
constitutions, legal codes and government pronouncements, de facto
implementation is often neglected and, in some cases, deliberately disregarded.  In 
most cases, the governance pattern is characterized by a powerful executive 
branch that exerts significant control over all other branches of the state, being in 
some cases free from institutional checks and balances.  Representative 
democracy is not always genuine and sometimes absent.  Freedoms of expression 
and association are frequently curtailed.  Obsolete norms of legitimacy prevail.”77
Bangladesh and Jordan are examples of good democracies.  Kuwait follows an Athenian 
model.  The King of Bahrain is moving towards a more parliamentary system while 
41
Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Oman and Brunei still remain traditional.  Thus 
these nations are making moves towards legitimate democracy; however, they are still 
experiencing the negative effects of modernization.
There is hope for the future.  Demographic structures in most Muslim countries 
show that young people below the age of 25 form more than fifty percent of the 
population.78  This generation, however, is not coming of age under the same 
circumstances that its parents have.  These people are born into societies that are already 
urban and modern.  They are provided with the opportunity for education.  Thus they are 
more hopeful and idealistic.  One can again see this situation manifested in Iran.  The 
new Iranian generation voted the reformist Mohammed Khatami into power.  In the 
February 18, 2000 legislative elections, the reformists won by a large margin.79  There 
has been a march to democracy in the Muslim nations today, which will lead to better 
relations with the West.  
In a similar vein to what Fouad Ajami argues, Gilles Kepel claims that September 
11th was a sign of the decline of Islamic fundamentalism rather than a sign of its strength.  
It was a desperate attempt to regain popular support.  Parallel to the 1981 assassination of 
Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat, the fundamentalists placed too much faith in the 
emotional reaction of the Muslim population and not enough effort towards their 
organization and mobilization.  America and Egypt, however, did not fall showing that 
the goal of these fundamentalist groups had failed.  Today the Islamist movement is 
declining due to the division between those who support moving towards democracy and 
those who are intoxicated by the concept of jihad. 
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The United States
Conversely, one must realize that the current US foreign policymakers are 
remnants of the Cold War.  The United States needs to accept the new world order.  The 
Cold War has now been over for a decade.  Unfortunately, most of the American foreign 
policymakers are still products of the Cold War generation.  They are of the “us versus 
them” mentality, accustomed to fighting an enemy and polarizing the world into 
opposites.  Today’s terrorists are not the same as yesterday’s communists.  They are not 
confined to one nation; they operate across traditional nation-state borders.  The policy of 
the United States towards Muslim nations must change if it hopes to foster international 
cooperation.  The United States must work with these states, not brand them as “evil”.  
Instead of identifying a particular nation as a haven for terrorists, it must work with the 
nation to eliminate its minority terrorist population.  When President Bush invoked 
images of September 11th while discussing the war in Iraq, he was exemplifying this 
negative behavior.  Iraq is not synonymous with Al Qaeda.  Terrorists can hit any nation, 
even those in the Middle East, as the November 2003 bombing in Riyadh demonstrates.  
Rather than trying to fit Muslim nations in the obsolete role of “them”, the United States 
should work even harder to foster cooperation so that the world as a whole can benefit.  
Globalization has broken down nation-state borders.  There has been a change in the 
concept of sovereignty as nations shift power towards regional alliances, to the 
supranational level.  There has been a large increase in the number of transnational 
actors.  Non-governmental actors, such as Amnesty International, the Group of 77, 
Human Rights Watch, and others are now becoming the forces with which to contend.  
America’s recent “go-it-alone” policy has served to alienate it from its former allies, such 
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as France, and potential allies in the Muslim world.  The next generation of politicians in 
the United States must move more towards a policy of cooperation and alliance rather 
than isolation and alienation.  
c. US Foreign Policy
One must be careful when labeling a movement.  Oftentimes a legitimate political 
cause, such as a movement for independence, is labeled an act of terrorism.  After the 
Iranian Revolution Amin Saikal claims, “[The United States] immediately labeled as 
‘fundamentalist’ all political forces of Islam that challenged or refused to recognize the 
USA’s hegemonic interests and accord it status as a global power.”80  President Bush put 
forward a definition of terrorism that “postulated that all hostile acts by sub-national 
actors and supported by states, irrespective of their causes and objectives, were in 
principle condemnable and punishable”. 81  The problem with this definition is that there 
is no distinction between mindless acts of violence perpetrated on a civilian population, 
and acts by states and subjugated peoples in the name of self-defense or resistance.  Many 
Muslim nations are attempting to modernize as they have gained their freedom from 
imperialist powers and thus there is a large threat that these movements could be deemed 
terrorist under the current US definition.  This fear is manifested in the Arab summit 
deciding to “reject the exploitation of war on terrorism to threaten any Arab country and 
reject use of force against Iraq.”82  It is important to note, however, that the United 
Nations has yet to adopt an official definition of terrorism.  Both the US and the UN thus 
must use careful discretion when attempting to form a definition of “terrorism”.  Without 
careful restraint using the term can have far reaching negative results.
44
George W. Bush v. Bill Clinton
A brief comparison between the Bush Jr. and Clinton administrations (particularly 
Clinton’s second term) shows the positive direction that Clinton was moving in and the 
negative direction that Bush Jr. is moving towards.  
The George W. Bush administration started the term in an aura of international 
defiance and global supremacy. The rhetoric of this administration has proven 
detrimental to hopes for peace with the Muslim nations.  In 2002, President Bush accused 
Iran of supporting the Taliban completely ignoring Khatami’s record of taking action 
against the Taliban.  In January 2002, invoking images of World War II, Bush made his 
infamous “axis of evil” speech branding Iran, Iraq and North Korea as members of the 
treacherous alliance.  He maintained that these nations would ally with terrorists against 
the United States.  However, Clinton had appointed an advisory panel, the Gilmore 
Commission, to examine the threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to 
terrorists by “rogue nations”, such as Iraq.  In December of 1999 the report concluded, 
“The rogue states would hesitate to entrust such weapons to terrorists because of the 
likelihood that such a group’s action might be unpredictable even to the point of using the 
weapon against its sponsor.”83
In order to gain support for his war in Iraq, Bush attempted to tie Saddam Hussein 
to Osama bin Laden.  This rumor, however, was proven false as bin Laden actually 
criticized Hussein for his actions.  The rhetoric of the Bush administration has turned not 
only the Muslim, but also the European world against the US.  His actions have proven 
costly to maintaining world peace.
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The Clinton administration attempted to make changes in its Middle East policy 
in the second term.  Washington DC, under the Clinton administration, developed the 
“Clinton doctrine”, which essentially stated that Islam is not a threat to American 
interests or to the West.   President Clinton himself said, “America refuses to accept that 
our civilizations must collide.”84  While still maintaining that adversarial forces of 
political Islam threatened Western interests, it also came to accept that in spite of a 
common religion these nations were divided along sectarian, cultural, social and political 
lines.  In other words, the Clinton administration accepted that the national divisions 
within the world of Islam had a large impact on their attitudes towards the West.  
The White House and the State Department essentially developed the Clinton 
administration’s Middle East policy while the Bush Jr. administration has made the 
Department of Defense a key player.  US military force needs to be used in conjunction 
with a well thought out political strategy to deal with the Muslim grievances, which have 
led portions of the population to turn to fundamentalism.  Rather than using the rhetoric 
of crusades and wars, the current administration must recognize the differences between 
the nations in the world of Islam and their attitudes towards the West as Clinton 
attempted to do.  Significant steps were made towards gaining peace in Palestine under 
the Clinton administration, but there has been no progress under the current 
administration and this will continue to lead to resentment against the West and in 
particular the United States.
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d. Palestine
The Palestine problem is leading to growing anti-American and anti-Western 
sentiment.  Zbigniew Brzezinski, former US national security advisor writes, 
“American involvement in the Middle East is clearly the main impulse of the 
hatred that has been directed at America.  There is no escaping the fact that Arab 
political emotions have been shaped by the region’s encounter with French and 
British colonialism, by the defeat of the Arab effort to prevent the existence of 
Israel and by the subsequent American support for Israel and its treatment of the 
Palestinians, as well as by the direct injection of American power into the 
region.”85
Tensions in the Arab world in Palestine started in 1967 when Israel annexed East 
Jerusalem.  Arabs were unhappy with the Israeli treatment of its non-Jewish population.  
The radical group Hamas was initially backed by Israel to counter the PLO (Palestinian 
Liberation Organization), similar to US actions backing the Taliban to stop the Soviets.  
Hamas quickly gained the radical support of other countries.
The Washington Post published,
“Though it has been contaminated by suicide bombings and other acts of 
terrorism, the Palestinian national cause and its goals are recognized as legitimate 
by the Bush administration and the UN, and they were accepted by Israel when it 
signed the Oslo accords of 1993.  Sharon and most of the rest of his government, 
however, never accepted these.”86
The Muslim nations, however, feel that the United States does not act as if the 
Palestinian cause is legitimate.  The main grievances center along the lines that the US 
cannot be a strategic ally of Israel and at the same time attempt to be an impartial peace 
broker.  These nations feel the US does not pressure Israel with United Nations 
resolutions like it does the Muslim nations. In Saudi Arabia the ulamma reframe the axis 
of evil and terror as the United States and Israel. The US is viewed poorly in the 
Palestinian issue because it provided the Israelis advanced arms.  The second Intifada 
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began in September 2001.  Since the start of the second Intifada ten Palestinians have 
been killed for every three Israelis.87  In the course of the fighting Israeli Prime Minister 
Ariel Sharon has constantly defied US calls for withdrawal from the Palestinian 
homeland. Even when Sharon was consistently defying the US, Ari Fleisher claimed, 
“[The Bush administration] believes Sharon is a man of peace” and extended him an 
invitation to the White House.88  This makes the Bush administration appear ineffective.  
It also makes it appear as if Bush is turning a blind eye to Israeli atrocities. Bush is 
viewed as benignly neglecting Sharon’s militant policies.  The Muslim nations feel that it 
is necessary to have impartiality, and as the United States is the only superpower, it is the 
only one that can attempt to solve the issue.  Without impartiality peace will never be 
achieved.
e. The Western Media
The voices of peace loving Muslims are drowned in the Western media and 
overshadowed by the voices of the fundamentalists.  This leads to a fear of Muslims on 
behalf of the Western population, which furthers the cycle of hatred and 
misunderstanding between these two groups.  The peace loving Muslims see themselves 
portrayed as evil fundamentalists in the Western media and grow to resent the ignorance 
of the West.  They also see President Bush as invoking deeply offensive rhetoric. As 
mentioned earlier when Bush Jr. described the war on terror as a “crusade”, he invoked 
memories of the Christian crusades, which resulted in much brutality against Arab 
Muslims.  Thus there are essentially two Muslim responses to Western media: they either 
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absorb it or totally reject it.  This two-fold reaction to the Western media has also 
manifested in the consequences of these two reactions.  
The fundamentalists can easily exploit the media in order to further their own 
purposes.  “This has given the main centers of orthodoxy unimaginable power and has 
allowed them to act and behave as the guardians of orthodoxy in a manner unthinkable 
and practically impossible only a few years ago.”89  Images of crowds yelling anti-
Western slogans and pictures of militant young men capturing embassies or blowing up 
planes do not discourage other young Muslims.  On the contrary, they attract them.  It 
gives them a sense of identity, a pride in their cause.  The media also brings the Intifada 
into the homes of Muslims.  They see their Muslim brothers being killed by the hundreds 
supporting a cause viewed as legitimate in their world.  This serves to further rally 
Muslims to the cause of their Palestinian brethren only serving to further resentment 
towards Israel and its Western supporters.  As mentioned earlier the ulamma of Saudi 
Arabia have deemed the United States and Israel as an axis of evil and terror.  Thus the 
media plays a role in assisting fundamentalist Islamists in their struggle against the 
West.90
f. Conclusions
Since the end of the Cold War American foreign policymakers have struggled to 
define policy in a new world order.  Unfortunately, the United States government has not 
yet been able to escape the Cold War mentality and thus foreign policy is still tainted by 
the race against the Soviet Union.  Today the United States has isolated itself from 
practically every other nation in the world. As we attempt to fight the global war on terror 
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it will become increasingly more difficult without the support of other states.  It is simply 
unrealistic to believe that the United States is capable of running the world on its own.  
The United States must realize and embrace the uniqueness of all nations.  It is 
unrealistic to hold every nation to the same standards since all nations are not equal.  
Thus a “cookie cutter” foreign policy where all nations are expected to follow the same 
textbook path to development is not feasible.  Only by accepting and incorporating the 
specific culture of each state can the United States hope to foster successful international 
relationships.  The United States must not impose its own culture on the rest of the world.  
One must not forget that the West was allied with a fundamentalist Islamic regime 
in Afghanistan for a decade against the Soviets.  If the West could work with a 
fundamentalist Islamic regime then clearly there is not an inevitable clash between the 
moderate world of Islam and the West.  If the West did not clash with the radicals in the 
1980s, then they should not have to clash now.  It is also important to remember that at 
all levels Islamic governments, with the exception of Iraq, pledged support for the war on 
terrorism in a variety of ways.  Thus rather than focusing on the clash between Islam and 
the West, the United States should start on working towards reconciling these two 
groups.
There is a need for reconciling democracy and Islam.  The United States must 
realize that it cannot provide a carbon copy of a US-type democracy in Islamic nations.  
The United States needs to help countries overcome the difficulties of modernization and 
democratization.  The United States needs to consider the young who are a large portion 
of the population and without direction.  In the wealthy states these people are 
underutilized because they are so extremely wealthy or because the managerial positions 
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are given to foreigners under the premise that it is easier to exploit a foreign worker than 
it is a domestic one.  If the foreigner puts up a complaint, he can be replaced.  (This is 
similar to the concept of prejudice against Southeast Asian Muslims discussed in the 
criticisms of Huntington.)  In poorer Muslim nations there simply is not enough work for 
these people and thus they are left unemployed and without direction.  Members of this 
demographic from both rich and poor countries are increasingly turning towards 
fundamentalism to provide direction.  The United States must seriously focus on 
incorporating these people into democratic society and giving them a voice and direction 
before more people turn towards fundamentalism as an answer to their problems.
Perhaps the United States should adopt a “new domino theory” of foreign 
relations in which it will sacrifice to get as many nations on its side- the side of the global 
community.  The war on terror and violence in general, will be put to an end once all the 
nations of the world can come together in a common forum and cooperate for the greater 
good.  America must lead the way in the realization of this goal.
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Chapter 4: Algeria
No other country in the Arab world was occupied as thoroughly or as long as 
Algeria.  Since 1962, the Muslim population of Algeria has more than tripled.  Three-
quarters of the population is under the age of 20.  Algeria also has one of the highest birth 
rates in the world, 3.07 in 1987.91  Today rapid urbanization has led to half of the 
population living in cities; 5 million people live in the Algiers metro area alone.92  The 
population is predominantly Sunni Muslim; only 1% of the population is Jewish or 
Christian.93  The elites are still the francophones, those who speak French as their first 
language.  In 1988, under the pressure of the street, the Algerian regime attempted to 
solve the country’s socio-economic crisis by proposing a program of political 
liberalization.  This attempt at liberalization started up one of the very first genuine 
democratic transitions of the contemporary Middle East and North Africa.  In 1992, the 
attempt at liberalization was crushed by military intervention and the declaration of a 
state of emergency.  Algeria was thrust into a violent civil war, which still ravages the 
country today.  Although the extremists seize the headlines with their outrages, the bulk 
of the Islamists are in fact dedicated to the peaceful political processes.  They are a silent 
majority that is being outflanked by the extremist wing of the movement, on the one 
hand, and decimated by the security forces, on the other.
a. History
The Benjedid Years (1979-1992)
In 1979, a new regime under Chadli Benjedid began to side with the Islamists 
because of the experience of the Iranian Revolution.  During this time the movement to 
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Arabize the educational system started.  Arabic speakers were associated with religious 
movements while French speakers were associated with elitism.  Students that graduated 
from high school speaking Arabic as a first language were at a disadvantage in the 
university setting where French was the preferred language.  Students finally began to 
protest this system.  The government decided to side with the Arabophones over the 
francophones in order to avoid conflict with the majority of the population.  The 
Arabization of the university system in 1979-1980 is seen as a precursor for 
Islamicization.
In March of 1981, the Islamists moved off-campus and destroyed a liquor store, 
the first public action of the group.  The government was determined to control religious 
organizations even though it sided with the Arabists.  Militants then seized the official 
mosque in an Algiers neighborhood to protest the arrest of one of their leaders.  Events 
escalated after this point.  The government finally provided the Islamists with the 
concession of the Family Code of 1984, which abrogated most of the liberal pro-female 
clauses of the 1976 Charter.  Among other things it officially accepted polygamy, 
prohibited marriage between a Muslim woman and a non-Muslim man, required women 
to obtain permission by a male family member in order to enter into contracts or to obtain 
a passport, and finally made divorce the choice of the husband.94  The creation of the 
Family Code was seen as the first significant victory for the Islamists representing the 
first time the state accepted shariah as the basis for Algerian law.  The protests continued 
to increase and spread to the economic sector in 1987.  
In the cultural center of Ryad-el-Feth, high school students and unemployed youth 
began a protest over the increased price of school materials.  This led to weeklong riots in 
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which the government clashed with Islamists.  On Thursday, October 6 (2 days after the 
start of the riots), a state of emergency was declared for the city of Algiers, the first time 
since the end of the war of independence.  
Benjedid proved different than Houari Boumedienne, the former Algerian leader.  
He was more inclined to compromise than repress.  He saw the need for liberalization in 
order to promote economic growth.  The President had never done or said anything 
before the riots about reforming the political system, but there was not much he could do
about the economy so he decided to concentrate on the political situation.  President 
Benjedid declared, 
“My conviction is that it is time to introduce necessary reforms in the political 
field, and to revise some institutional structures and constitutional foundations in 
order to adapt them to the next stage…On this matter, a project is being prepared 
which will be subject to the decision of the People…We will eliminate the current 
monopoly of responsibility and will permit the official institutions of the State, 
the Parliament or others, to play their part in the control and monitoring of the 
State.”95
The final cost of the October riots was $20 million in damage.  Ironically the outcome of 
the reform helped neither the military, which wanted to maintain its power, nor the 
fundamentalists who were seeking Islamicization, not merely political change.
The first step in the opening of the political system was to create an election for 
the President, which occurred on November 22, 1988.  Benjedid was re-elected with 80% 
of the votes.  90% of the population voted, however, he was the only candidate.96
Although this was not necessarily the most democratic election, Benjedid was needed to 
further democratic reform so it was a positive step in the right direction. 
A new Constitution was developed on February 23, 1989, eliminating the 
reference to Algeria as a socialist state.  The Constitution also called for pluralistic 
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parties; the FLN no longer was the single party of the state.  Algerians gained the right to 
strike and form independent unions.  They were granted freedom of expression and 
association.  However, the power of the President was also increased so there was no 
longer a balance of powers between the different governmental branches.  The President 
and the military were granted sweeping emergency powers with the new Constitution.97
Islam was incorporated into the state by being recognized as the official religion of 
Algeria.  At this time the elite leadership split; some supported democracy and others 
wanted to stop the process.  
During this time there were three different Islamist groups: Al-Irshad wa al-Islah 
(Guidance and Reform which became known as Hamas in 1990), al-Nahda (Renaissance) 
and the FIS (Islamic Salvation Front).  Al-Irshad wa al-Islah tried to distinguish itself 
from the conservative FIS.  It supported the equality of genders, the right of women to 
work outside of the home, a multi-party election, and the gradual implementation of 
shariah.  Al-Nahda was somewhere between Hamas and the FIS.  It was founded in 
December of 1988.  It wanted an Islamic state and the application of shariah law, but was 
against the use of force.  Its policies on women were more conservative than Al-Irshad 
wa al-Islah’s.  It felt that women should stay at home. 
On February 21, 1989, the FIS was officially formed.  It was an outgrowth of 
Rabitat Dalwa (the League of the Call).98  The party was recognized in September when 
the government ignored its own anti-religious-based party law.  The organizational 
structure of the FIS led it to quickly become the key opposition party to the FLN 
(National Liberation Front).  The FIS took to campaigning in the streets because its 
constituency did not buy newspapers or weekly magazines.  The party attracted a lot of 
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members because of its novelty and because it was seen as having forced the regime into 
giving concessions.99  The FIS was a divided group.  One faction wanted the conservative 
application of shariah law.  The other faction wanted shariah law, but also focused on 
technology, development and economic issues.  The FIS, like Al-Nahda, was against the 
use of force.100
In March of 1989, the FLN cut its military ties.  In September of that same year 
the Parliament officially recognized the Islamic and Berber Parties.  Under presidential 
pressure the Parliament approved the FIS as a huge political gesture.  In 1989, the 
government relaxed censorship and gave greater freedom to the written press although 
the televised media remained under state control.  This led to a better-informed public 
and thus better political debates within the nation.  As the government relaxed its 
economic control and the people were freer to speak out, more and more protests and 
strikes occurred demanding even further economic change.  In February 1990, the right to 
strike was officially recognized by the government.  
In April 1990, one year after the creation of the FIS, 600 to 800,000 people were 
attracted to an Algiers rally in support of the party.101  Even the FLN, the pre-existing 
political party, could not attract numbers like that.  “The FIS is the People” and “Islam is 
the Solution” were two of the popular slogans of the time.  The FIS supporters wore 
beards and kamis (a long flowing shirt inspired by the Prophet).102  Part of the FIS 
success was due to the fact that it made specific efforts to include the rural poor.  
Oftentimes the FIS was the only party to canvass the countryside.  “No other political 
movement seem[ed] quite as attuned to the full range of problems of urbanization as the 
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Islamists, not just in economic and social terms, but even in cultural, psychological, and 
value terms.”103
There was still a widespread fear over the repression of the newly formed political 
parties.  In addition to the logistical changes Algerians had to make now that they were 
allowed to form parties, they had to make a psychological change, which was even 
harder.  When asked why they did not register their party for the local elections of June 
1990, the moderate Islamic party Ennahda replied, “We did not trust the government; we 
were afraid.”104  The FIS were seen as risk-takers because they actually trusted the 
government.  They were rewarded for this risk-taking in the June 1990 local elections 
where they took over 55% of the nationwide votes.105
Seeing the success of the FIS in the local elections, the FLN attempted to redraw 
electoral boundaries in its favor prior to the June 1991 Parliamentary elections.  They 
restructured boundaries so that there was no longer a system of one man- one vote.  They 
made it so that 80,000 people counted as one in the north of Algeria (the FIS stronghold) 
while 30,000 people counted as one in the south (the FLN stronghold).  This clearly 
weighed the election in their favor.  The FLN also changed the electoral laws so that 
whoever got the majority of votes got the majority of Parliamentary seats.  Previously 
there had been proportional allotment.106  In retrospect the FLN would have been better 
off had it left the Parliamentary system to proportional seating.
The FIS protested the changes in the process and called for strikes on May 25.  
The strikes failed, but they were then able to mobilize supporters in violence against the 
security forces.  The government had been waiting for an excuse to shut down the FIS 
and thus cancelled the elections and declared martial law.  They arrested top FIS leaders 
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claiming they had declared war against the Algerian state.107  The Prime Minister 
resigned in protest to the military intervention.  The repression of the FIS, however, only 
served to further undermine the trust in and legitimacy of the state.  In August 1991, the 
FIS excluded leaders who advocated pulling out of the electoral process and who 
attempted to find extra-political means of gaining power.108  The leaders did not believe 
that the process was truly democratic anymore, but they believed that the ballot box was 
the only means of gaining legitimacy for the FIS.  
The violence calmed down and another election was scheduled for December 26.  
The FIS came away with a landslide victory in the Parliamentary elections, and was 
poised to win a 2/3 majority of the Parliament seats.  This would have allowed it to 
amend the constitution under Algerian law.  The security forces stepped in and forced the 
President to dissolve the Parliament and then step down.  Mohammed Boudiaf, a former 
leader of the war of liberation living in exile in Morocco, was asked whether the military 
could and ought to stop the electoral process.  He replied, 
“Now the FIS is here, they have the majority, they have to lead the 
country…Either it is a democracy, or we turn against the FIS and jeopardize 
everything…To argue that we can stop the FIS experiment and still keep on being 
a democracy is to contradict oneself…For what should we do next?  Are we to 
dissolve the FLN?  The other parties?  Are we to leave them as they are?  In 1988 
it was time for change and we did not do it.”109
The High State Council Years:
On January 11, 1992, President Chadli Benjedid stepped down because he could 
not promote democracy.  Upon stepping down he announced that he had covertly 
dissolved the Parliament one week earlier.  This eliminated the position of the next in 
line, the Speaker of Parliament.110  Three days later the High Security Council announced 
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the creation of a collective Presidency under the High State Council (HCE).  The HCE 
voided the December elections and cancelled the upcoming elections.  It claimed that the 
FIS was antidemocratic and using the democratic process in order to instill a theocracy.  
It also accused the FIS of organizing fraud.  The leader of the FIS, Abdelkader Hachani, 
urged restraint.  He argued that, 
“confronted with this extremely difficult situation we must reinforce our bond 
with God, imploring him with prayers and days of fasting…We call upon the 
people to arm themselves with vigilance and prudence, to be prepared to respond 
to any urgent matter dictated by the superior interest of God and Algeria.”111
The FIS realized that long-term democracy was at stake and was not willing to jeopardize 
the situation with violence.  The HCE became the new ruling body and was quickly 
denounced by the three main political parties.  
At the end of February 1992 Mohammed Boudiaf, head of the HCE, announced a 
$4 billion economic recovery package.  The government, however, quickly squandered 
the foreign aid.112  From 1990-1992 Algeria’s external debt increased from $1 billion to 
$27 billion.  76% of its export revenue was going towards repaying this debt.113  This led 
to further dissatisfaction in the population.
Tidjani Haddam, the token Islamic presence on the HCE, left the committee 
because he saw that it was heading towards an all out war with the Islamists.  On 
February 9, 1992, the HCE declared a state of emergency and the FIS was banned.114  In 
less than two months 10,000 alleged FIS activists were arrested and exiled in prison 
camps.115  In June of 1992, Boudiaf was assassinated by one of his guards.116  This led 
the military to increase its activities against the FIS.  In 1993, the HCE extended its 
mandate another five years and extended the state of emergency by one year in order to 
help the transition.117
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A 1993 media law dramatically limited the freedom of press.   The increased 
repression only led to the further radicalization of the Islamic youth.  In 1993, there 
became internal dissent within the FIS between the moderates and the radicals.  During 
this time there was increased guerrilla warfare with the creation of the MIA (Armed 
Islamic Movement), GIA (Armed Islamic Groups) and later AIS (Islamic Salvation 
Army).    
In 1995 attempts at peace were made.  In January 1995, the FIS, which had been 
legally dissolved on March 4, 1994, and seven other parties of the opposition against the 
regime signed “A Platform for a Political and Peaceful Solution to the Algerian Crisis” 
sponsored by the Sant’Edigio Catholic group in Rome.118  The main points of the 
platform centered on respect for human rights, the rejection of violence and the 
recognition of the three different cultures that form the Algerian identity.  The groups 
demanded the liberation of FIS leaders and other detainees.  They demanded the freedom 
of the press and the cessation of torture.  They condemned the attacks against civilians 
and foreigners.  They called for a commission to investigate the acts of violence and 
human right abuse.119  At this point all of the changes in the regime had just managed to 
return the regime to the status quo ante bellum.  There had been no political, economic or 
social improvement.  
In March of 1995, the government granted amnesty to those who would give 
themselves up as armed Islamic militants.120  Liamin Zeroual won the November 1995
Presidential elections with 60% of the vote.  75% of the population turned out for the 
elections.121  To the outside it looked as if Zeroual was a popular leader because the 
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Algerian media was controlled and foreign journalists were afraid to enter Algeria 
because of GIA threats.  The regime thus gained new legitimacy with these elections.
In 1996 the Constitution was changed in order to give the President even more 
powers.  In June of 1997, the Parliamentary elections were clearly rigged.  The masses 
protested once again showing that the regime was using the façade of democracy to gain 
political legitimacy.  The results of the November 1997 election were again botched.  
Economic problems still were at the forefront of Algerian issues.  The IMF debt 
restructuring led to competition over scare resources even among the elite.  In 1998, the 
government privatized state-owned enterprises in lines with IMF demands.  This resulted 
in 380,000 jobs lost over the course of just three years.122
In 1998 Zeroual stepped down.  In 1999, new elections were held with seven 
candidates.  For the first time since it was banned, the FIS did not boycott the election.  
Instead it discreetly threw its support to Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi, a moderate Islamist.  The 
night before the elections were scheduled to take place the candidates withdrew citing 
election irregularities.  The only remaining candidate, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, won the 
election the following day with a mere 20% voter turnout.123  The former candidates 
called for protest rallies against the regime.
Similar to the situation in 1997, the President attempted to make a truce with the 
AIS.  All of the influential FIS leaders voiced support for the peace agreement known as 
Mezrag’s initiative after Madani Mezrag, the leader of the AIS.
1999 had proved one of the least violent years in the civil war because of the truce 
signed with the AIS.  On September 16, 1999, the “Law on Civil Concord” passed 
legitimizing Bouteflika as the country’s leader.  However, 2000 turned violent again 
61
coinciding with a debate over the re-legalization of Islamic parties when the government 
refused to recognize Taleb Ibrahimi’s pro-Islamist party.  The newfound confidence in 
the President was quickly lost when the state of emergency was extended for another year 
in February of 2000.
Summary
Essentially, the FLN failed to manage the economy profitably, manage the 
population growth and failed to provide meaningful political participation to the people.  
This led to the downfall of the regime and the current crisis in which the nation finds 
itself.  The marginalization of the high school and college graduates without work, the 
urbanization and modernization, the inequality broadcast worldwide and the fact that 
Islam was already used as a basis for judgment of right and wrong led to its success in 
opposing the regime.  The overall problem of the regime was that the opening of the 
political process was not accompanied by economic success.  The new generation grew 
up post-revolution so the FLN did not represent that party of revolution but rather the 
party of economic failure.  
Due to the fact that Algeria was a deeply Islamic society and the fundamentalists 
had a network of institutions in mosques, religious schools and social service facilities, 
the FIS was in a perfect position to oppose the regime.  The FIS used education, money, a 
clear-cut message, modern media technology, electioneering, municipal power bases, its 
largesse and broad network of sympathizers to reach into the ruling FLN.  Under the FLN 
authoritarian system the only free institutions were the mosques established by the 
fundamentalist mullahs in the 1970s and 1980s so they were the only organization 
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capable of taking advantage of the widespread dissatisfaction. No other group was 
poised to take control because they were not as organized and lacked the infrastructure 
and influence that the FIS had.  It was also the only party with nationwide dimensions.  
The role of Islam in Algeria is similar to the role that the Catholic Church played in 
Poland’s revolution against communism.  However, the nations of the West were not 
afraid that a theocracy would be established in Poland so they supported the actions of 
the dissidents.  There is more of a fear of Islam today, though, and thus the West did not 
lend its aid when the Islamists came to power democratically.  This does not mean that 
there can be no democratic resolution to the problem, but rather it means that more 
initiatives like those taken by the Sant’Edigio group must be supported in order to reach a 
peaceful resolution to the crisis.
b. The Islamist Movement
“The FIS, as other Islamist organizations in North Africa, claims it has no specific anti-
Western agenda, and that the West should not fear its coming to power.”124
From 1968 to 1989 al-Jamiat al-Islamiyya (the Islamic Group) provided the most 
direction to the Islamist movement.  The group challenged the state-run social services 
because its charitable organization and donations surpassed the states’ donations.  For 
example, on October 29, 1989, al-Jamiat al-Islamiyya responded to an earthquake before 
the state did.125  In 1971 the first free mosque (Masjid al-Arkam) was created.126  In 
October of 1979, students went on strike demanding the Arabization of the university 
system and the dismissal of the cultural minister.
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There were three types of influence on the Algerian Islamists.  The intellectual 
influence came from the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt and Syria.  Algerian students who 
studied abroad picked up ideas from these places thus showing the links with other 
nations.  Hamas and al-Nahda were influenced by this tract.  
There was also the ideological influence, which came from Saudi indoctrination.  
The Saudis sought to counteract the effects of the Iranian Revolution.  They distributed 
pamphlets, used the free radio, and invited students to study in Saudi Arabia in order to 
spread their influence.  This was similar to tactics that the communist party in the Soviet 
Union had used for its satellite states.  
Finally, the methodic influence came from the experience of the Afghan war.  
This manifests itself in the core membership of the GIA.  There are a lot of parallels with 
the international jihadi movement.127
The Islamist leaders came from a variety of places.  They were recruited in the 
alternative mosques established in the 1960s and 1970s.  A large number were teachers 
and mullahs imported from Egypt and other Arabic countries to assist in the Arabization 
of the population oftentimes bringing the notions of groups such as the Muslim 
Brotherhood with them.  The Islamist groups were also made up of university students 
and graduates who joined the fundamentalists due to economic strife.  Finally, secondary-
school aged students joined the movement because they were closed off from 
advancement by the economic recession.  The government lowered standards of 
education in order to educate more people, but then the students were left to graduate 
with no employable skills. Science students and university professors largely 
characterized the movement in the 1970s.  By the 1980s it was comprised of mostly 
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secondary-school students.  The students were left with no alternatives.  They saw Arab 
nationalism failing worldwide with the loss of the Six-Day war, the economic disparity 
between Arab nations and the rest of the world, and the ultimate affront to Muslims when 
the Saudis extended the invitation to the infidels to “invade” the holy land.  The frustrated 
youth had turned to Arab nationalism or Soviet Marxism, and now they turned to the 
umma.  The new breed of Islamic mullahs and followers distinguished themselves by 
wearing beards and traditional Muslim clothing following the example of the Prophet.  
They created impromptu mosques in storefronts.  The new movement helped to unite 
dissatisfied urban and country youth.
The FIS saw the solution to the Algerian problem as being neither economic nor 
political.  The party believed that they needed to heal the internal spirit of the Muslim 
population.  They believed that the way to solve the ills of rapid urbanization was through 
Islamic principles not economic solutions, which had only served to create the problem in 
the first place.
The problem was that no one was quite sure what the FIS represented.  It 
attempted to fuse two groups that opposed the government.  The Islamists supported 
democracy and used new technology to spread its message.  This faction was led by 
Abassi Madani who embraced modernism and felt that the Algerian state could be 
maintained in essentially its present form with more Islamist views taken into 
consideration.  His followers were sometimes referred to as “techno-Islamists”.  They 
wanted to insert themselves into the bureaucracy but not bring it down.  The second 
faction was led by Ali Belhadj who was against Westernization.  They were seeking to 
return Algeria to an impossible past.  They felt that they could alter mores, but not 
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economic or political situations.  This faction was made up primarily of the poor youth 
and those with only a secondary-school education.  
“The Madani group routinely watches, in great frustration, the many ‘seductive’ 
foreign broadcasts available to those with access to the paraboles (satellite 
dishes), while Belhadj’s constituency seeks to tear out the ‘forest of mushrooms 
that have sprouted over Algiers in recent years’ and with them any connection to 
the modernism they see as so threatening.”128
Alternate Groups
The GIA and other guerrilla movements have been placed on the US State 
Department Terrorist Watch List after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.  This 
inhibits the regime from carrying on discussions with the rebels because it does not want 
to offend the US by giving the movements legitimacy.  However, for the most part the 
Islamic guerrillas have focused their attention at home and not on international terror.  
The guerrilla movements provided economic opportunity in the form of black market 
smuggling.  The main guerrilla movements in Algeria were the MIA (Armed Islamic 
Movement), GIA (Armed Islamic Group), and AIS (Islamic Salvation Army).  As the 
GIA gained more and more power, the AIS (Islamic Salvation Army) was created with 
remnants of the MIA.  
MIA
In October 1981 the MIA was developed to challenge the regime by force.  As the 
GIA developed, turf wars ensued between the two groups and the MIA eventually 
splintered with its remnants going to form the AIS.
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GIA
The GIA recruited young men deprived of leisure activity and needing something 
to do.  The GIA broke from the FIS because it placed too much emphasis on election 
politics and expressed uneasiness towards violence and the attacks on civilian 
collaborators of the FLN.  The party has several hundred to a few thousand members in 
the country.  Young Islamists, called “Afghans” because they fought with the 
Mujahedeen against the Soviet Union, form the core of the group. 
After the 1992 military coup the GIA formally split from the FIS.  The GIA has 
called for an all out war against the government and civilians that are not Islamic enough, 
especially women. The GIA has been active in targeting civil servants and members of 
the government.  The purpose of its violence is to show that the state could not protect 
itself nor could it protect its supporters.  The GIA targets all foreigners.  One of its main 
goals is to slow down the economy, especially the oil industry.  The GIA serves to hinder 
the efforts of Islamic groups.  As the GIA had no use for the political system or political 
rule at all, it became isolated and followed military exercises that were not aligned with 
the political objectives of the Islamists.  
The GIA primarily serves to embarrass the FIS.  In the long run it hurts the party 
because people associate it with the FIS and thus hold the FIS responsible for the 
violence.  They are a classical effect of the radical flank effect, similar to the role that 
terrorist organizations serve in Spain in regard to the Basque separatist cause.  There is 
actually the potential that the GIA has threatened the FIS and said that it had to either 
become part of the group or else become a target.  These claims, however, have not yet 
been substantiated.129 The GIA is easily infiltrated by the security forces and is thus 
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easily manipulated.  There are claims throughout Algerian and Western society that the 
security forces have actually perpetrated acts of violence and blamed them on the GIA to 
make it appear as if the Islamists are an uncontrollably violent group.
AIS
Formed from remnants of the MIA, the AIS membership is about 12,000 to
15,000 men.  They formally declared that they are only fighting the security forces and 
thus denounced the killing of civilians and foreigners.130  Currently they are tacitly allied 
with the FIS.
Summary
Essentially the Algerian Islamist movement can be characterized by three 
different movements.  The religio-political movement was comprised of welfare and 
religious groups and associations that rejected the state monopoly on Islamic discourse.  
The politico-religious movement represented by the FIS, Hamas and Al-Nahda wanted 
the non-violent transfer of power.  The radical Islamist movement was represented by the 
violent guerrilla movements of the MIA, GIA and AIS.131  Unfortunately it is the more 
radical groups that gain media attention and thus cloud the image of the peace loving 
Islamists.  The responses of victims of terrorist attacks are central to this problem as well.  
The clampdown in the West post September 11th has greatly backfired.  The GIA has 
only been further determined in its cause by the attempts at repression.  The FIS must 
attempt to find a way to control the radical groups or its message will continue to be 
sullied by extremists.
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c. Islamist Relations with Foreign Nations
Arab States
A large part of FIS funding came from the World Muslim League, primarily from 
Muslims in Saudi Arabia.132  The FIS actually distributed pamphlets from a Saudi group 
showing that science and technology are not merely monopolized by the West, but rather 
the Arab world has made significant contributions to the fields over the years.  Thus at 
the beginning of the Gulf War the FIS openly mocked Saddam Hussein.  It was only 
when American troops entered Saudi Arabia, and the population became inflamed, that 
the FIS spoke out against the Western presence in the Middle East.  On January 18, 1990, 
FIS leaders stood in front of the parliament suggesting that Algeria send volunteers to 
Iraq.133  Consequently the FIS lost its Saudi funding.
The FIS was against the Iranian Revolution because they are not seeking to 
overthrow the regime but rather to create an “alternate public space” within society.  
They want to create Islamic institutions that would foster Islamic values in the existing 
Algerian society.  They were not seeking to completely destroy society in its present 
form.134  In spite of this fact some Arab states, such as Tunisia, Libya and Egypt 
supported the HCE because they feared the Islamic fundamentalists within their own 
borders.135  In March of 1993, Algeria cut off diplomatic ties with Iran and Sudan 
because of their support for Islamic insurrections.136
The FIS is feared to be part of a broader transnational Islamic fundamentalist 
network, but in reality it is focused on issues within its own borders.  In fact, the 
fundamentalist Algerian Islamists in other countries have only shown support for their 
brothers in Algeria; they have never taken action.
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The West
The Western democracies sat by and watched the democratic process fall apart in 
Algeria.  The FIS called for Western aid to restart democracy, but the ongoing civil war 
and the actions of the guerrilla groups such as the GIA worked against the FIS’ goals.  
The French and others said that the results of the 1991 FIS-victorious elections would not 
change the nature of the Algerian-French relationship.137  This, however, was not the 
case.  France did not stop its aid to Algeria even though the elite blatantly denied 
democracy.  The French supported the Algerian government largely because they feared 
a wave of Muslim immigrants.  The European Union was concerned with maintaining a 
secure southern border and was worried over the instability that could result if the 
Islamists came to power.  Thus Italy and Spain were also willing to forego democracy in 
the name of stability.  
The EU and US post- 9/11 have economic agreements (the Mediterranean 
Partnership for the EU) with Algeria overlooking the authoritarian regime in the name of 
stopping Islamic fundamentalism.138  Western nations were worried about trade, 
especially oil interests.  Due to the fact that the French did not want to lose trade with the 
Algerian elite, they did not support the 1995 Rome Peace Conference.  Even though the 
FIS told the US that it would encourage US investment, the US also did not intervene.  
The FIS claimed that the French never gave up their control of the country and 
that the military and FLN were simply the puppets of Paris.  French support of the FLN 
was actually the kiss of death for the party because they lost any leftover revolutionary 
credibility.
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The lack of response by the Western democracies to an event like the Algerian 
democratic transition and civil conflict is presented by Islamic fundamentalists as another 
proof of the evil Western ambition to maintain the Muslim world in a state of 
dependency.   They claim, 
“that Western democracies should remain passive while a democratically elected 
Islamic party is unceremoniously dismissed by the Algerian military is but one 
more indication that Western powers collude with the autocratic forces of the 
Muslim world to deny Muslim citizens their rights.”139
Algerians saw the neutrality of the West as an indication of the fear of Islam.  An 
Algerian university student named Karim had this to say about the canceling of the 
elections and the lack of Western response, “the reason why the canceling of the elections 
and the dissolution of the FIS, the leading political party, did not arouse any reaction 
from the world community was the ‘fear of Islam in the West’.”140
There were other factors that led to the lack of response by the West other than 
the fear of Islam.  The failure of democracy in Algeria occurred during the democratic 
transitions of the USSR and Eastern Europe (1988-1991) and thus the West was more 
focused on these transitions and not on Northern Africa and Algeria.  There were also the 
technical difficulties of an intervention in Algeria.  The UN and US had just undertaken 
peacekeeping operations in Somalia.  The images of the Black Hawk Down incident were 
fresh in the American publics’ mind and they were loath to go into another African 
country.  
The fact remains that in spite of the technical difficulties of intervention it is very 
hypocritical for the West to claim to want to implement democracy in the Arab world 
when it will not even support democracy in these nations.  France and the European 
Union have said that they would continue dialogue with Algeria but only if it would 
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follow democratic ideals.141  How can they expect the Algerians to follow democratic 
ideals when they did not support them the first time?  Currently, the West is providing 
support to authoritarian or military regimes in Muslim countries such as Pakistan.  Unless 
these policies change, the vision of democracy will be doomed to sour in the minds of 
Muslims everywhere.
d. Conclusions
“The frustrations generated by the unbalanced economic development, coupled with the emergence of 
more fully democratic procedures in politics, fuelled the growth of Islamism as the principal expression of 
a collective desire for fundamental change.”142
The attempt at democracy did not solve the socio-economic or political problems 
of the regime.  Democracy only served to further aggravate these tensions.  The swift 
changes in 1988 were not accompanied by an improved understanding of the mechanisms 
permitting political pluralism to function effectively. The fact that the regime attempted 
political and economic reform simultaneously in part led to democracy’s failure.  The 
government was not prepared to meet the increased demands of the people.  There was 
competition between the short-run economic goals and the long-run political objectives.  
It is better to reform economically first and then politically so that the system can handle 
the increase in the public demand.  Without the proper formal and informal social 
institutions one cannot transform civil society to support democracy.  The lack of 
dialogue between the citizens and the institutions of the state also led to the exacerbation 
of violence.  
There was not enough time between the legalization of political parties and the 
elections themselves.  Seventeen months is simply not enough time to create a viable 
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party.  Thus an essentially two-party system was created, as the FLN and FIS were the 
only ones with ample resources.  
The Algerian failure was also due to the fact that the elites were divided on the 
issues of democracy and liberalization.  The fact that the democratic transition was 
conceived of and executed by members of the FLN and military led to its inevitable 
failure.  Neither group was truly willing to give up power.  If they were really sincere 
about democracy they would have consulted with other political parties.  The 1989-1991 
democratic transition leaned too much to the side of Islamic fundamentalism and thus 
stirred up the fears of the military elite.  At the same time the Islamic fundamentalists 
failed to transform their popular support into an institutional political force.  Although the 
FIS captured the most important demographic, the under thirty-year-olds, they lost 
control when the political opportunities were shut down with the military intervention of 
1992.  
The lack of openness in the political system remains the main obstacle to the 
formation of a cohesive Islamic party in the current Algerian state.  The moderate 
Islamists base their goals on the electoral system, from which they are currently 
excluded.  Due to the lack of political opportunity there is no way for the Islamists to 
support political democracy in Islam.  With the situation as it is today only armed conflict 
can result.  
While terrorism should of course be a concern of the West as well as of the 
region, it is important that labels such as “terrorism” and “fundamentalism” be carefully 
examined before they push the United States into strong stands against native movements 
that threaten existing, usually unconstitutional, regimes that seek Western support. 
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Supporting rigged elections does little to show the population the virtues of democracy 
and democratic practices.  Islam is not fundamentally opposed to democracy.  The 
principles of shura (consultation) and ijma (consensus) resonate with democracy.  Islam 
can actually help the state because it is a very charitable religion.  The Islamists in 
Algeria were actually able to materially support the population with temporary 
employment, scholarships and health care.  
In order to get a resolution to the current crisis the FIS must be included in the 
political dialogue of the regime.  The FIS must also attempt to stop the violence of the 
radical Islamist groups.  It needs to assert political control over the guerrillas.  With the 
help of mediation from Western states a peaceful and democratic resolution can still 
ensue.
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Table 6: May 30, 2002 National Assembly Election Results* 149
Party Initials %
Front pour la Libération Nationale/Jabha al Tahrir al Watani
(Front for National Liberation, socialist) FLN 34.3 
el-Islah/Movement for National Reform Islah 9.5 
Rassemblement national pour la démocratie (National Rally for 
Democracy, authoritarian) RND 8.2
Mouvement de la société pour la paix/Harakat Moudjtamaa 
As-Silm (Movement of the Society for Peace, islamist) MSP 7.0
Parti du Travail (Workers' Party, socialist) PT 3.3 
Algerian National Front FNA 1.6 
Mouvement de la Renaissance Islamique/Harakat al-Nahda 
al-Islamiyya (Islamic Renaissance Movement, moderate islamist) MRI 0.6 
Party of Algerian Renewal PRA 0.3 
Movement of National Understanding 0.2 
Non-partisans 4.9 
Source: percentages: IPU Parline
*The elections have been boycotted by the Front des Forces Socialistes (Front of Socialist Forces, social-
democratic Berber), the Rassemblement pour la Culture et la Démocratie (Rally for Culture and 
Democracy, liberal Berber) and the Mouvement pour la démocratie en Algérie (Movement for 
Democracy in Algeria, moderate islamist). The Front Islamique du Salut (Islamic Salvation Front, violent 
islamist) is still illegal.
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Table 7: April 8, 2004 Presidential Election Results*150
Candidate %
Abdelaziz Bouteflika - Rassemblement national pour la démocratie 85.0 
Ali Benflis- Jabha al Tahrir al Watani/Front pour la Libération Nationale 6.4 
Abdallah Djaballah- el-Islah 5.0 
Said Sadi- Rassemblement pour la Culture et la Démocratie 1.9 
Louiza Hanoune- Hizb al-Ummal/Parti des Travailleurs 1.0 
Fawzi Rebaine- Ahd 54 0.6 
Source: Wikipedia 
*The elections have been boycotted by the Front des Forces Socialistes (Front of Socialist Forces, social-
democratic Berber), the Rassemblement pour la Culture et la Démocratie (Rally for Culture and 
Democracy, liberal Berber) and the Mouvement pour la démocratie en Algérie (Movement for 
Democracy in Algeria, moderate islamist). The Front Islamique du Salut (Islamic Salvation Front, violent 
islamist) is still illegal.
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Chapter 5: Indonesia
Indonesia is the third largest democracy in the world. There are 583 ethnic groups 
and local languages or dialects in Indonesia.  The four officially recognized religions are 
Islam, Christianity, Hinduism and Buddhism.  Almost 90% of the population in Indonesia 
is Muslim making Indonesia the largest Islamic nation in the world.  Indonesia won 
independence in 1945.  In 1949 the most fanatical partisans of a fully Islamic state began 
a thirteen-year guerrilla war against the army.  The ulemas and other militant Islamic 
groups were organized into political parties who actively participated in the bloody 
repression of the Indonesian Communist party in 1965.  In 1967, General Suharto became 
president.  Suharto marginalized the religious institutions by delegating control of the
nation to the army.  By the early 1970s Indonesian ulemas, along with all the other 
groups working to install Islam as the basis for the nation’s government, had become 
greatly enfeebled politically.  Despite harassment from the regime they succeeded in 
preserving their networks of education and solidarity in the form of Koranic schools and 
mosques.  In October 1999, Abdurrahman Wahid, a Muslim theologian and religious 
leader, as well as a defender of human rights and religious tolerance, became the 
country’s first democratically elected president.  Most recently Indonesia has been in the 
news for the October 2002 terrorist bombing at a Bali nightclub frequented by foreigners, 
which killed more than 200 people.  The bombing was apparently orchestrated by 
Indonesian Islamic radicals linked to Al Qaeda.
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a. Democracy in Indonesia
Indonesia is governed under the constitution of 1945, which was restored in 1959. 
The unicameral legislature is the 500-member House of Representatives (Dewan 
Perwakilan Rakyat or DPR), 462 of whom are popularly elected and 38 of whom are 
appointed from the military. This body, plus 500 indirectly selected members, make up 
the People's Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat or MPR), which 
meets every five years to determine national policy and to elect the president (who must 
be a Muslim) and vice president. The president, who is the chief executive, appoints a 
cabinet.  Since independence Indonesia has practiced three forms of democracy: 
Parliamentary democracy (1950-1959), Guided democracy (1959-1965), and Pancasila 
democracy (1966-present).  The first was more of a liberal democracy while the second 
was more of a socialist democracy.  The Guidelines of State Policy of 1993 give the 
following definition of Pancasila Democracy,
“A political democracy based on Pancasila is essentially the manifestation of 
popular sovereignty carried out through deliberation/representation based on the 
lofty values of Pancasila.  Pancasila Democracy implies that national problem-
solving concerning society and state is conducted, as far as its management does 
not follow the idea of separation of powers purely, but follows the idea of 
separation of powers based on family-like spirit.  Pancasila Democracy does not 
recognize any form of opposition, majority dictatorship, and minority tyranny.  
The relationship between the governmental institutions as well as between them 
and other state organs is always based on the spirit of togetherness, integrity and 
responsible openness.”151
It is described in the government textbook entitled “P4 Upgrading” published by the BP-
7 as, 
“a democracy based on the idea of family-like ethics and mutual cooperation so as to 
realize people’s prosperity, which consists of:
1. Elements based on religious consciousness and the refusal of atheism.
2. Truth, love, lofty morality and Indonesian characteristics.
3. Equilibrium between individual and social interests, between human and Divine 
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relations, between material and spiritual aspects.”152
President Suharto explained, 
“Pancasila Democracy is a democracy, in which the sovereignty of the people is 
being inspired and integrated with other principles.  This means that in applying 
democratic rights it should always be accompanied with the sense of 
responsibility towards God Almighty according to one’s respective religion, 
uphold humanity in line with dignity of man, guarantee and strengthen the unity 
of the nation and should be utilized in realizing social justice.  Pancasila 
Democracy is founded on family-like and mutual help principles.”153
The Indonesian concept of Pancasila is best understood as an example of 
corporatism defined by Philippe C. Schmitter as,  
“…a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized 
into a limited number of singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically 
ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not 
created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within 
their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their 
selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports.”154
Pancasila democracy does not represent a traditional pluralist democracy in which a wide 
variety of interest groups are represented and free from state interference in leadership 
selection or interest articulation.  Instead, Pancasila democracy stresses “family-like” 
bonds, and a responsibility towards God the Almighty.  In line with the corporatist model 
there is not a true separation of powers, but rather coordination among branches in the 
name of the “family spirit”.  It does not officially recognize opposition.  Instead it 
envisions all governmental and non-governmental actors working together for the good 
of Indonesia.  
In 1989, there was an increase in the demands for openness.  The level of 
education and income of the population had risen and thus they demanded more from the 
government.  Democracy was started in the midst of a major financial crisis.  The 
economy went into meltdown in 1997.  In October 1997, the country was plunged into 
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economic upheaval when its currency plummeted. The stock market followed soon after, 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) agreed to provide the country with a $40 
billion aid package in exchange for economic reforms. Struggling under a huge foreign 
debt and Suharto's reluctance to implement the IMF reforms, Indonesia's economy 
continued to worsen in 1998. Student protests and riots over rising prices broke out 
across the country, with increasing demands for Suharto to resign. Suharto finally stepped 
down in May 1998, and his vice president, B. J. Habibie, assumed the presidency, 
pledging reform, clean government, and economic responsibility.
June 7, 1999, represented the first free elections with Abdurrahman Wahid 
declared the winner.  Wahid was a religious moderate who said, “Using religious politics 
is a dangerous tendency.  Let the government govern and let the religious groups take 
care of their own affairs.”155  Wimar Witoelar described President Wahid,
“I don’t think there’s anyone in Indonesian history who is as enlightened as he is 
in ideas of diversity, pluralism, ethnic tolerance, religious understanding, and 
human rights.  If he were not the president, he could get a Nobel Prize for his 
thoughts.  But being president, he has got to manage, he has to watch the budget, 
he has to know which account to put his money in, and he’s flunking in all these 
day-to-day government matters, but the man is a very, very good person.”156
In 2001, Wahid resigned and Vice-President Megawati Sukarnoputri assumed the 
Presidency.
There were problems with incorporating democracy in Indonesia.  First, the 
population’s expectations of democracy were far too high.  The middle class and related 
institutions of civil society were too small to socialize the rest of the population.  A year 
after his election Wahid was still unable to stop the cronies of the former regime from 
blocking reform.  There was also a lack of political capital. Divisions within the reform 
movement as to whether the state should be replaced with an Islamic one or whether the 
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concept of Pancasila would still work hindered the democratic process.  The legislature 
had more power than the President showing that the constitution was only functional 
under an authoritarian system where the power was centralized with the President 
anyway.  The system suffered from years of corruption.  The government was filled with 
“yesmen” who were not concerned with the true good.  The legal system was 
dysfunctional, characterized by corrupt officers who destroyed any credibility in the rule 
of law.  There was still a key element of organized crime within the nation as well.  
Finally, the military was antagonistic towards the regime.  As Thomas Friedman 
described Indonesia, it was “too big to fail but too messy to work.”157
b. Muslims in Indonesia
The Muslim intellectual group consists of probably 100 to 200 people throughout 
Indonesia but most heavily concentrated in Java, Bogor, Bandung and Yogyakarta.158
The Muslims seek to support the government’s policy of economic development, take a 
leading role in activism to set an example, and develop Islamic institutions compatible 
with national development.159  “Muslim intellectuals are adamant that Islam applies to all 
people in all times and places, which means it has some adaptability.”160  Indonesia was 
fortunate in that it lacked the pervasive fundamentalists that other nations, such as 
Algeria, faced.  In fact, the image of Algeria’s failure was a vivid rhetorical image in 
debates.
In 1969, the US government created a plan where it invited young Muslim men to 
study in the United States in order to promote more open-mindedness.  These men then 
returned to Indonesia to tutor the rest of the population.  Nurcholish Madjid was a 
participant in this plan and had a very successful experience.161  In the 1970s a paper 
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written by Nurcholish launched a new movement.  The leading figures came from 
traditionalist homes educated in the pesantren and madrassas (Islamic schools).  They 
read Arabic and studied classic texts of Islamic learning.162  The new movement was 
referred to as “neo-modernism”.  It combined classical Islamic learning with modern 
Western thought.  Nurcholish, Djohan Effendi and Abdurrahman were key figures in this 
movement.  According to Abdurrahman, the concept of Pancasila represented civil 
religion so there was no need to break it down and instill an Islamic state.
As Ruth McVey observed, 
“By 1968 tension between government and Islam was openly acknowledged; 
from then on, religious parties and activists appeared ever more clearly in 
opposition, and with the general election of 1971 Islam established itself as the 
chief popular voice against the regime.  It is not the Muslim modernist who led to 
protest, however, but the hitherto reluctantly political traditionalist.  Their 
opposition does not simply reflect the reaction of rural obscurantism; to the 
contrary, ‘traditional’ Islam has increasingly become the voice of younger-
generation, urban protest against the status quo…”163
The NU (Nahdlatul Ummat Party) and Perti were Islamic groups that represented 
nationalism.  The PSII (Indonesian United Islam Party) and the Parmusi represented 
Islamic modernists.  The NU was decreasing in power because they were not technically 
skilled.  They also were suffering from the depoliticization and deidealization of Islam in 
government.  However, in the 1971 election the NU still preserved its seats in Parliament.  
On January 5, 1973, the PPP (United Development Party) was formed fusing four 
Islamic political parties (the NU, Parmusi, PSII and Perti).  In 1973 the main 
governmental parties were the Golkar, PPP and PDI (Democratic Party of Indonesia).  
The four parties, however, also turned into mass organizations: the NU became the 
Jamiyyah NU, the Parmusi the MI (Indonesian Muslims), the PSII the SI (Islamic 
Association) and Perti retained its name.  The PPP leadership was controlled by the 
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ulamma.  The PPP’s objective according to the 1975 PPP National Conference was “to 
create a just and prosperous society materially and spiritually, based on Pancasila and the 
1945 Constitution in the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia blessed by Allah the 
Almighty.”164  In 1973, the PPP opposed the Bill of Marriage because it violated Islamic 
law.  The group eventually succeeded in gaining a Marriage Act that was in line with 
shariah.  The Bill of Political Parties and the Bill on General Elections of 1975 allowed 
religion as the basis for the PPP.  In 1975, the adoption of Pancasila as the basis for all 
political and military organizations reduced the tension between the government and 
Muslims.  In 1977, the PPP adopted the ka’ba (the cubic shrine in the great mosque of 
Mecca which represents the direction to which Muslims turn in praying) as its symbol.  
The government rejected this blatantly religious symbol, but the PPP held on to it.  The 
PPP felt it was in a favorable position for the 1977 elections because it was the only 
Islamic party; however, they only gained 29.3% of the vote (2.2% more than the total of 
all four parties in 1971).  The Golkar party gained 62.1% (.7% less than 1971), and PDI 
8.6%.165  The 1986 elections were the worst for the PPP to date.  The party had changed 
its symbol from the ka’ba to the star of the Pancasila, but this move made it seem as if it 
was no longer Muslim.  Adding to the PPP’s problems, the NU left the party in 1984.  In 
the 1986 election the PPP got 16% of the vote, the Golkar 73.2% and the PDI 10%.166
At this time a new Muslim intelligentsia was forming due to the success of the 
government’s development plans.  This group was made of scientists and intellectuals, 
civil servants and technocrats, community developers and social organizers, businessmen 
and those involved in the private sector, and political activists.
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There was an Islamic resurgence towards the end of Suharto’s regime as he used 
the Muslim militants to counteract the military.  He legalized the wearing of the jilbab
(headscarf) by female students in state schools.  He signed a new bill regulating the 
Islamic Courts.  The new marriage law made interreligious marriage virtually impossible, 
similar to the 1984 Algerian Family Code.  In March 1989, Suharto signed a new national 
education bill making religious education (including Islam) a compulsory subject in 
Indonesian schools.  In order to appeal to the Muslim population he made the Haj in June 
1991.  He assisted in the building of mosques and Muslim schools.  In December 1990, 
General Suharto formed an association of Muslim intellectuals known as the ICMI (the 
Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals). 167 The head of this group, B.J. Habibie, 
would later lead the government in its interim transition period.
In March 1992, Wahid wrote a letter to Suharto saying that if he frustrated his 
efforts to develop a democratically inclined society tolerant of diversity, then there would 
be potential for an “Algerian” situation.168  Meaning if the military clamped down on 
Islamic political activity then it would weaken the states’ democracy and radicalize the 
Islamist movement.  Wahid argued that Indonesia was poised to be the “savior of the 
Islamic world”.  He said, 
“all that the West sees in Islam is radicalism and its incompatibility with modern, 
open, democratic politics.  Indonesia, however, has the opportunity to show that 
politics based on confession – in Algeria or Iran- is not the only way.  Not only 
can modernity and open politics exist in a Muslim-majority society, and here in 
Indonesia, but it can also be nurtured so that democracy can flourish well in 
Islam.”169
In November 1992, Nurcholish Madjid presented a theological argument 
supporting Islamic tolerance of everyone, especially the “People of the Book”.  He traced 
the origins of the word Islam as meaning “to surrender to God”.  This, however, does not 
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specify any particular religion.  Thus anyone that surrenders to God, such as the “People 
of the Book”, can be considered Muslim because Islam is a universal faith.170
There was a division in the Muslim population between structuralists and 
culturalists.  The structural approach was concerned with the political process while the 
cultural approach was more concerned with the socialization and internalization of 
Muslim values.  The structuralists wanted to adopt Islam as a means of solving societal 
problems.  The structuralists could agree with the culturalists but the culturalists did not 
necessarily agree with the structuralists.  The culturalists felt that Islam should 
complement the socioeconomic change the regime was undergoing rather than attempt to 
alter the regime.
Summary
Since 1990 Indonesia had seen Islamic faith becoming an “insider” to politics.  As 
Bilveer Singh observed of Islam in Indonesia,
“Ironically as the secular New-Order leadership had effectively managed political 
Islam in Indonesia, the late 1980s and early 1990 witnessed the resurgence of 
political Islam in the country.  This was primarily the result of Islam’s re-
adjustment to the changing realities of the time, with greater focus being paid to 
the development dimension rather than religion per se.  This also gave it a new
visibility which it never had in the past…The legitimacy of the new Islam in 
Indonesia can be seen in the rise of Islamic activities in the universities, with the 
masses adopting Islamic values, symbols and ways of life more openly.  Clearly, a 
renaissance of new Islam had occurred.  A new sense of boldness and confidence 
can be discerned as Islamic publications proliferate throughout the country.  
However, unlike elsewhere, the tone is moderate, and the focus is more on socio 
economic development.”171
The Muslim intellectuals supported democracy because the values were in accord with 
Islamic values of society.  Democracy was also an effective way to communicate Muslim 
ideals because the Muslims were in the majority and democracy is based upon majority 
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rule.  The Muslim intellectuals were the “agents of change” interpreting the Qur’an for 
the masses.  There were, however, constraints to this push for democracy.  While the 
intellectuals demanded free thought, they were constrained by Islamic theology.  The 
ideas of the Muslim intellectuals were often not allied with the government.  They also 
were far removed from the Muslim community at large.  The elite needed to learn how to 
translate their ideas into operational language.  They needed to stop setting themselves 
apart from the masses through cultural distance.  Finally, they needed to show solidarity 
with the poor.  As Carle wrote, “It is certainly proper for Islam to contribute to the 
national development, but it cannot claim that the most important contribution comes 
from Islam alone.”172
c. Extremist Muslims
Muslim militias accelerated under the interim President Habibie who tried to 
mobilize Muslim support in order to retain power.  Some of these militias found their 
origins in the Pam Swakarsa (Self-Help Security Guards).  The main groups were Laskar 
Jihad, Jemaah Islamyiah, and the Islamic Defenders Front.  
Laskar Jihad
The national militia group known as Laksar Jihad (Holy War Warriors) trained 
outside of Jakarta in Bogor.  The training camp was made up of over 3,000 young men 
primarily from rural Java.  Ja’afar Umar Thalib led the group.  He had attended a 
fundamentalist training camp in Pakistan.  Laskar Jihad’s followers were adherents of 
Wahhabisim.   The group gained support from the Tarbiyah movement, which formed 
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congregations in several Indonesian Universities such as the Bandung Institution of 
Technology.  Fuad Bawazier, an opponent of Abdurrahman, financed Laksar Jihad.  The 
group was allied with the Islamist Justice Party because of their ties to the former military 
dictatorship.  Laskar Jihad operated in the open.  Members of the group carried swords 
and sharp weapons but were not stopped by the police.173  The group even had an office 
in Java and solicited donations outside of mosques after Friday prayers.174
In the region of Ambon there was competition between Christians and Muslims 
for jobs.  As the Muslims increased their level of education they began to compete with 
the Christians for scarce employment.  This increased competition led to violence 
between the two groups.  The Christians had been winning the war until May 2000; 
however, they made the fatal mistake of massacring at least 500 Muslim men in the 
Tobelo district of Halmahera.  This massacre infuriated the Laskar Jihadists and they 
entered the trouble quickly turning the tide of the conflict in favor of the Muslims.
Laskar Jihad also supported the Muslims of Maluku as they fought the Christians 
of the region.  In mid-January hundreds of Christians were rounded up and assaulted.  
Both men and women were forcibly circumcised as part of their “conversion” to Islam.  
There were psychological as well as physical health concerns as a result of the attack; the 
circumcisions were done with unsterilized razors and old knives.  Local Islamic leaders 
claimed that they were forced to partake by young radical Muslims.175
The military turned a blind eye to the violence.  Some even provided arms to the 
militia group.  There were actually allegations that members of the military who 
supported the former Suharto regime were associates of this movement.  Abdurrahman 
replaced the structure of the military in Maluku in an attempt to regain order.  On June 
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26, 2000, he declared a civil state of emergency imposing a curfew and weapons checks.  
He was against a full-blown military intervention because of its previous failure.  He also 
distrusted the military because he had suspicions that they were part of the militia 
movement.  
In September, Abdurrahman declared martial law in the region of Maluku.  He 
wanted to stop the movement of people across the islands.  Members of Laksar Jihad, 
however, were still able to move across the archipelago suggesting that elements of the 
military were supporting the group.  After the June 2001 incident in which 23 Muslims 
were killed by the intervening Indonesian military troops, Ja’afar issued a fatwa telling 
Muslims to kill the ranking Indonesian military commander in the region.  In November 
of that same year the Indonesian troops withdrew.
As the issue in Maluku died down, the violence in Poso exploded.  In April 2000 
fighting erupted because of a brawl between a Christian and a Muslim youth.  In August 
of 2000 the governors of five provinces called a truce, but in April of the next year 
violence again erupted because three Christian commanders were sentenced to death for 
their involvement in past years of violence.  In August 2001, Laskar Jihad called for a 
jihad in Poso once again turning the tide against the Christians as it had done in Maluku.  
The government sent troops in leading to the stabilization of the region.  The security 
forces however, preferred to let the violence run its course before they intervened.  The 
government did not try to repress Laskar Jihad, but rather attempted to mediate a truce at 
the end of 2001 known as the Sulawesi truce.
Although it is primarily a domestic group, Laskar Jihad is known to have had ties 
with Al Qaeda and its networks pre-9/11.  After the September 11th terrorist attacks 
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Ja’afar tried to distance the group from Al Qaeda claiming that he turned down bin 
Laden’s offer of training and arms.  It is reported, however, that he accepted arms from 
Abu Sayyaf (head of a Philippine terrorist group) instead.176  In May 2002 Ja’afar was 
arrested for inciting religious hatred and presiding over an illegal execution.  
Jemaah Islamyiah
The Jemaah Islamyiah group also follows the Wahhabi strain of Islam.  It seeks to 
establish an Islamic state.  The group is prevalent in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Muslim 
islands of the Philippines.  It is run by the Indonesia cleric leaders Abubakar Ba’asyir and 
Riduan Isamuddin or Hambali as he is known.  The Koranic Schools of Java in the 1970s 
became breeding grounds for terrorists.  Under Suharto these groups were suppressed, but 
after his fall they were able to reform.  In August of 2000 Ba’asyir returned to Indonesia 
and was appointed the head of the Indonesian Advisory Council (MMI).  The MMI was a 
coalition of militant Islamic groups, which was centered in the city of Yogyakarta.  The 
group is primarily trained abroad.  Osama bin Laden has attempted to radicalize this 
group in order to serve his purposes.  Like Laskar Jihad, Jemaah Islamyiah operates 
primarily in the open.  
Islamic Defenders Front
The Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) was established in August 1998.  It is led by 
preachers of Arab descent.  The group boasts 10 million members in 16 provinces.  The 
group is less of an Islamic group, however, and more of an extortion ring.  It is funded by 
political sponsors and increasingly extorts money from the entertainment centers in 
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Jakarta and western Java.  The FPI attacked cafes and bars in Jakarta, but they did not 
cause serious injury.  The violence in Jakarta and cities on Java was largely symbolic.  
Summary
It is important to remember that a large majority of Muslims in Indonesia do not 
support an Islamic state.  In the Parliamentary elections in June of 1999, secular and 
moderate Muslims were given a large majority.  The PDI-P and Golkar, both secular 
groups, combined for 57% of the vote.177  These Islamic groups operate mostly 
domestically.  In spite of their anti-Western and anti-democratic stances they do not 
target Americans or the West.  As moderate Islamic scholar Nurcholish Madjid observed, 
“Wahhabism is very much a minority trend in Indonesian Islam and is stigmatized by the 
mainstream.”178
President Megawati has avoided taking action against alleged members of 
terrorist networks or local extremists.  This has angered Western nations, particularly the 
United States, which site the examples of Singapore and Malaysia both of whom have 
made significant breakthroughs in the war on terror.  Indonesians point out that they are a 
majority Muslim nation and lack a central authoritarian structure thus making it more 
difficult to apprehend Muslim extremists.  The truth is that it poses a great political risk 
for Megawati to move against the extremists because she needs Muslim support in 
Parliament for the 2004 elections and she fears she would alienate them by rounding up 
militants.  It is important, however, to remember that President Megawati was the first 
leader of a major Muslim country to visit President Bush after September 11th.  Perhaps 
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after the 2004 elections Megawati will be more secure in her position and thus better able 
to handle the Muslim extremists in the nation.
d. Conclusions
Indonesia has remained fairly uninvolved in major issues in the Muslim world.  
When asked to comment on Jakarta’s policy toward the Middle East, Foreign Minister 
Malik said, “Indonesia did not regard [those countries in] that region as important, except 
for pilgrimage every year.  With the exploitation of oil, we then became aware of their 
importance… We want to approach them after they become rich.  We have now corrected 
our past attitude.”179  In fact, Jakarta had a grudge against the Saudi government because 
of the way that it had handled the pilgrim disaster (the Mina Tragedy) in July 1990 in 
which more than 700 Indonesian pilgrims died.  Saudi Arabia refused to give Indonesia 
full information on the incident.180
Contrary to popular Muslim opinion, Abdurrahman felt that it was important to 
sign a peace accord with Israel.  He held a pre-emptive meeting with Arab leaders to 
show his support on the Palestine issue and then was planning on meeting the Israeli 
Prime Minister Barak.  However, the pressure from the right wing at home led him to 
cancel this meeting.181
In February 1994, Minister of Defense, Feisal Tanjung, announced that Indonesia 
had sent 25 troops as observers to Bosnia and would send approximately 200 more in the 
near future.182  In 1986 the government arrested 13 Indonesian Muslim volunteers who 
wanted to go to Afghanistan.  Now when Islamic organizations registered volunteers for 
Bosnia, the military did not take action against them.183  Suharto actually formed the 
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KISDI (Committee of Solidarity with the Muslim World), which sponsored activities in 
support of Bosnian Muslims.  The funds were raised through the National Committee for 
Solidarity with the Bosnian Muslims.  
It is important to note that Indonesia has never attempted to become a leader of 
the Islamic movement even though it is the largest Muslim nation in the world.  It has, 
however, attempted to take control of the Group of 77, which is not based on Islam.184
Indonesia is a successful example of a politically secular government managing to 
promote Islamic culture and spiritual interest while discouraging the use of religion as a 
vehicle of political mobilization.  Islamic intellectualism and culture are thriving in 
Indonesia.  Its example shows that in spite of continued military resistance, democracy 
can thrive in the world’s largest Islamic nation.
e. Map and Table
Map 2: Indonesia185
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Table 8: April 5, 2004 Election Results186
Party Name Initials %
Partai Golongan Karya (Party of the Functional Groups, authoritarian) Golkar 21.1 
Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (Struggling Indonesian 
Democratic Party) PDIP 19.5 
Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (National Awakening Party) PKB 11.9 
Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party, 
moderate islamist) PPP 8.3 
Partai Demokrat (Democrat Party) PD 7.5 
Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Prosperous Justice Party) PKS 7.2 
Partai Amanat Nasional (National Mandate Party, moderate islamist) PAN 6.5 
Partai Bulan Bintang (Crescent Star Party) PBB 2.6 
Partai Bintang Reformasi (Reform Star Party) PBR 2.3 
Partai Karya Peduli Bangsa (Concern for the Nation Functional Party) PKPB 2.1 
Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan din Indonesia (Justice and Unity 
Party of Indonesia) PKPI 1.1 
Partai Damai Sejahtera (Prosperous Peace Party) PDS 1.6 
Partai Nasional Banteng Kemerdekaan (Freedom Bull National 
Party) PNBK 1.0 
Partai Persatuan Demokrasi Kebangsaan (United Democratic 
Nationhood Party) PPDK 0.9 
Partai Patriot Pancasila (Pancasila Patriots' Party) PPPC 0.8 
Partai Persatuan Nahdlatul Ummah (Indonesian Nahdlatul 
Community Party ) PPNU 0.8 
Partai Nasional Indonesia Marhaenisme (Indonesian National Party 
Marhaenisme) PNIM 0.7 
Partai Penegak Demokrasi Indonesia (Indonesian Democratic 
Vanguard Party) PPDI 0.7 
Partai Merdeka (Freedom Party) PM 0.7 
Partai Pelopor (Pioneers' Party) PP 0.7 
Partai Sarikat Indonesia (Indonesian Unity Party) PSI 0.5 
Partai Perhimpunan Indonesia Baru (New Indonesia Alliance Party) PPIB 0.5 
Partai Persatuan Daerah (Regional United Party) PPD 0.5 
Partai Buruh Sosial Demokrat (Social Democrat Labour Party) PBSD 0.5 
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Chapter 6: Lebanon
Around 95% of Lebanese are Arabs, with 70% of the population Muslim.  
Traditionally the president is Christian while the prime minister is a Sunni Muslim and 
the speaker of parliament a Shiite Muslim.  The Ta’if accord of 1989 gave Muslims a 
share in governmental power equal to that of Christians.  Lebanon gained independence 
in 1944.  The 1970s were characterized by civil unrest and fighting between the 
Lebanese, Palestinians, Israelis, Syrians and intervening UN and US troops.  Until 1975 
Lebanon was the most open of all the Arabic-speaking countries boasting decentralized 
power, real democracy, rule of law, unimpeded movement, a Hong Kong-style free 
market, independent schools, and an unfettered press.  In 1983 a terrorist bombing 
partially destroyed the US embassy in Beirut and in October of that same year a truck 
bomb killed US Marines and French soldiers resulting in the multi-national force leaving 
Lebanon in 1984.  In the late 1980s Iran started backing Shiite groups that became 
notorious for holding Western hostages.  By the mid 1990s the clashes continued and in 
1996 intense fighting erupted between the Shiite Hizbullah guerrillas and Israel in south 
Lebanon.  A tentative ceasefire was reached but fighting erupted again in June 1999.  In 
2000, Israel engaged in a gradual withdrawal from south Lebanon turning over its 
position to its Lebanese Christian ally, the South Lebanon Army.
a. Civil War
The civil war started on April 13, 1975.  The south Lebanese wanted to rid 
themselves of the armed Palestinians.  Thus Hizbullah virtually took over the South to 
carry on the fight against the SLA (South Lebanon Army) and Israel. 
98
In 1993, the fighting between Hizbullah and Israel increased.  The Americans 
brokered a peace deal in which the Israelis claimed they would stop targeting civilians 
and Hizbullah said that it would stop missile attacks into northern Israel.  This shows the 
transition of Hizbullah from a terrorist organization to a guerrilla movement.
The violence, however, continued and the Israelis accidentally hit a UN post in 
Lebanon killing four UN soldiers and some civilians.  This led to international outrage 
and pushed Shimon Peres to agree to a new cease-fire.  Again both sides agreed to leave 
each other’s civilians alone.  This agreement was in writing (as opposed to the 1993 
verbal agreement) and was monitored by the US, Syria, Israel and Lebanon.
In 1995 the Israelis were losing one soldier to every five Lebanese soldiers killed 
in the conflict.  In 1998 the ratio was approaching 1 to 1.187  Israeli citizens were 
beginning to refer to the incident as Israel’s Vietnam War.
In 2000 Hizbullah increased its attacks.  These attacks were met by the Israeli 
“Operation Grapes of Wrath”.  The Israelis once again attacked citizens, but Hizbullah 
did not return in kind.  On May 22, 2000, the Israelis finally pulled out.  The SLA 
disintegrated and many members sought asylum in Israel.  UN spokesman Timur 
Gokksel told the BBC, “The role of the South Lebanon Army in southern Lebanon is 
finished.”  By May 24, the Israelis had totally withdrawn.  This was heralded as the first 
Arab victory over Israel.  The war that had been going on since 1982 left 1,200 Israelis 
dead, 5,000 Lebanese dead (thought to be a gross underestimation), and cost $20 billion 
in damage.188
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Aftermath of the Civil War
80% of southern villages were damaged and two villages were almost destroyed.  
It is estimated that over 10,000 Lebanese fled from the South to Israel and other 
destinations.189  Between 1991 and 1997 it is estimated the 820,000 Lebanese citizens 
emigrated.  In 2000 they were emigrating at a rate of 19,000 a month.  The emigrants also 
found refuge in the Palestinian camps sometimes outnumbering the Palestinians.  Even 
more moved to the slums of Beirut.  
Economically the country was on the verge of collapse.  The national debt at the 
end of 1998 reached $18.3 billion.  The budget deficit reached 59.3%.190  The economy 
also suffered from a freeze in foreign and domestic investment, high inflation, high 
unemployment and a record high number of foreign laborers.
The militias of all sects became inactive at the end of the civil war leaving large 
numbers of militiamen without anything to do.  The economy was wrecked and thus there 
were no jobs.  It was the perfect situation for the mobilization of these men.
b. The Origins of Hizbullah
The same factors that led to the mobilization of the third world were present in 
Lebanon.  In the 1950s rapid urbanization coupled with the decline of the agricultural 
sector hurt the poor Shia.  The rural poor moved into the slums at the core of Beirut 
where they were confronted with the wealth and Westernization of the Christians and 
Sunnis.  In 1975 the political mobilization of Maronites instigated the Shia to counter-
mobilize.  The eviction of 100,000 Shia from Nab’a in August of 1976 led to the 
radicalization of the Shia as they were forced to resettle in the suburbs of Southern 
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Lebanon.  The Shiite tradition of cult suffering and oppression were perfect for 
mobilizing the population.  In 1978 the disappearance of Musa al-Sadr led to an upsurge 
in support of the Islamist group Amal.  The successful example of the Iranian Revolution 
further spurred the Shia to mobilize.  The 1982 invasion of Lebanon by the Israelis was 
crucial to forming Hizbullah.  Ironically Israel’s success in eradicating the PLO 
(Palestinian Liberation Organization) presence in southern Lebanon led the Lebanese 
resistance groups to come into power.  They were no longer oppressed by the PLO and 
thus were able to come to the forefront.
The Creation of Amal
On July 6, 1975, Musa al-Sadr announced the creation of Amal, an organization 
born of the Lebanese abandonment of its southern territories and the Israeli attempt to 
bring the region to its knees.  Amal aimed to reinforce the notion of “Lebanon’s status as 
a cultural window through which West…meets East.”191  Amal had been in the making 
since 1974.  Its fighters were trained by the PLO yet they were forbidden to become part 
of the civil war. Amal did assist in the proliferation of arms to the public.  Its goal was to 
integrate all the militias into a governmental institution that could be an auxiliary to the 
regular Lebanese army and would be capable of repulsing the Israeli attacks.  There was, 
however, a divergence in the Lebanese militias.  Some were working for a democratic 
nationalist secular order.  They were members of the Lebanese Nationalist Movement 
and supported Arafat, Libya and the extreme Palestinians.  The other faction was 
isolationist.  They wanted to maintain power and to eliminate the Palestinian presence.  
They sought to reduce Lebanese entanglement in Arab politics.  Failing isolation they 
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would opt for partition of Lebanon.  They were known as the Lebanese Front.  It was 
comprised of the Maronite oligarchy and supported more or less by the rightist forces in 
the country, conservative Arab regimes and Israel.
On August 31, 1978,  Musa al-Sadr disappeared in Tripoli, Libya. He was due to 
meet with the Libyan leader Moammar Kadhafi on the day of his “disappearance,” in one 
of the most notorious police states in the world. The Libyan government repeatedly 
claimed that its distinguished Lebanese “guest” and his two followers, Sheikh 
Mohammed Yaaqoub and Abbas Badreddine, had left for Italy. The claim was 
unconvincing and an Italian court ruled that the founder of Lebanon’s Amal Movement 
and his followers never set foot on Italian soil.  Musa was seen as disappearing in a Sunni 
land at the hands of a Sunni leader thus showing the constant struggle between these two 
factions.  His legacy was the creation of hospitals, orphanages, and schools in poor 
regions of Lebanon.
On April 4, 1980, Nabih Birri was selected as the leader of Amal.  Birri was a 
militia leader thus showing the triumph of the military over the political in the movement.  
The Creation of Hizbullah
While Sadr influenced the Amal movement, the religious academies of Najaf, Iraq 
were also breeding grounds for resistance.  In the 1960s and 70s young Lebanese Shia 
studied under Ayatollah Khomeini and Mohammed Baqr as-Sadr.  These young men 
returned to Lebanon trying to recreate the Iraqi-bared Da’wa Party but instead established 
the Lebanese Muslim Student’s Union in the early 1970s.  
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Hizbullah was an umbrella organization, which banded together the alienated 
Amal members, Islamic Amal members, individual clerics and their following, Lebanese 
Da’wa, the Association of Muslim Ulama in Lebanon and the Association of Muslim 
Students.  Membership in these organizations overlapped with membership in the 
Committee Supportive of the Islamic Revolution.  Thus Hizbullah was formed as a 
political and military organization out of a broad and diverse movement.  Hizbullah 
started as a religious movement in the early 1970s, metamorphasized into a disorganized 
resistance movement, which later transformed into a structured political party.  
Hizbullah’s primary goal was to rebuild Lebanon; however it used the rhetoric of 
denouncing Israel in the West Bank and Gaza.  
The Committee of Nine was formed as Hizbullah’s first supreme decision-making 
council.  It was comprised of three ex-Amal members, three clerics and three members of 
the Committee Supportive of the Iranian Revolution.  The Shia supported neither the 
Lebanese nationalist movement nor the Lebanese Front.  They upheld the Palestinian 
cause; however, they were being pushed too far in the South.
Hizbullah supported the 1983 attack on the American Embassy because it was 
aimed at “American spies” (the CIA station in the Embassy was destroyed).  In October 
1983, 241 US servicemen were killed in south Beirut when the US Marine barracks were 
bombed.  Hizbullah also supported this attack, claiming that the US overstepped its 
observer status by shelling Druze and Syrian targets in defense of the Maronite 
Christians.  Hizbullah felt that there was a fundamental tie between the United States, 
Israel and the Lebanese President, thus if one was hit, they all were hit.  In an open letter 
to a Lebanese newspaper Hizbullah claimed that the attack on the American Embassy 
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was the first punishment for the Western presence in Lebanon, the attack on the US 
Marines was the second.
In 1992, the Secretary-General of Hizbullah resigned because the group had 
decided to participate in the elections.  Hizbullah had realized that an Islamic regime like 
the one in Iran was impossible for the time being because of the Christian population.  
The party’s “Statement of Purpose” claimed, “We don’t seek the application of Islam by 
force or violence but by peaceful political action, which gives the opportunity for the 
majority in any society to adopt or reject it.  If Islam becomes the choice of the majority 
then we will apply it, if not, we will continue and discuss till we reach correct beliefs.”192
Hizbullah felt that it was unjust to impose Islam on the population through the use of 
arms.  Only after the Shiite messiah, the twelfth Imam, comes would the entire 
population become Muslim. “The party did not believe that the use of violence against an 
oppressive but legitimate government was religiously or morally justifiable, especially 
when public disorder was the most probable outcome.”193
As the group began to evolve politically, it also began to change its attitude on 
violence.  “Hizbullah draws the line at the killing of Western civilians, which it strongly 
condemns.”194  The group expressed regret for the killing of 19 Greek tourists in Cairo in 
April 1996 at the hands of the Islamic Group.  It also opposed the killing of seven 
Trappist French monks in Algeria in the same month by the GIA (Armed Islamic Group).  
It condemned the massacre of 58, mainly Western tourists, at the Temple of Hatshepsut 
in Luxor, Egypt in November 1997 also at the hands of the Islamic Group.  
Hizbullah draws a line between fighting Western military targets in Lebanon and 
using violence on Western soil.  Husayn al-Mussawi discussing the attack on the US 
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Marines wrote, “It was not they who went to New York or Washington.  New York and 
Washington came to them, and the act occurred in Beirut not in the US.”195  From this it 
can be implied that Hizbullah would not support attacks on US soil.
Hizbullah began to pursue a dual strategy by confining the quintessentially 
Islamic and unattainable goals to the intellectual realm while bringing the secular and 
attainable issues to the national political realm. Hizbullah supported democracy in the 
political realm but an Islamic state in the intellectual realm.  Democracy was the next best 
system to Islam.  Hizbullah was in opposition to the regime because it felt that it was 
promoting democracy in appearance, but not in practice.  It wanted to end the Lebanese 
system of confessionalism as a means to gain the equality of opposition groups.  It 
supported a proportional representation system, which would still give the Christian 
minority power counteracting the fear that if the Muslims came to power the Christians 
would be completely excluded from the government.  
The support of a non-secular citizen’s democracy was not a means of 
monopolizing political power and instituting Islamic rule, but rather was an end in itself.  
Hizbullah was not trying to overrun the democracy.  Hizbullah did say, however, that it 
would support an Islamic state if the vast majority of the people wanted it.  Although this 
seems contradictory, there would never be enough of a majority to obtain an Islamic 
regime due to the pluralistic nature of the Lebanese state.  
In terms of Western culture and Islamic culture, Hizbullah does not see an 
existential clash.  They see not a civilizational conflict but rather a civilizational dispute.  
The distinction between the two terms is important because a civilizational conflict 
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implies an irreconcilable difference while a civilization dispute implies that there can be 
harmony and the two cultures can coexist.
Summary
Hizbullah was respected not only because of its military work, but also because of 
its charity work.  By the early 1990s Hizbullah had established a vast social infrastructure 
to meet the needs of the Shiite population.  It created hospitals, pharmacies and schools.  
Between 1988 and 1991 Hizbullah repaired over 1,000 homes, offered loans, created 
scholarships, reestablished public utilities, created agricultural cooperatives, and sold 
seed, fertilizer and pesticides at below market level prices.  “Hizbullah gives assistance to 
the Lebanese people, not to Lebanese religious sects, and this is the reason why they have 
so many backers,” wrote Georges Najem, a Maronite Christian who represented 
Hizbullah in Parliament.196  In 2001, even the US Secretary of State for Near East affairs 
recognized that Hizbullah had many purposes.197
Because there were many factions that were encompassed under the umbrella of 
Hizbullah there were different conceptions of Hizbullah.  The US branded Hizbullah as a 
terrorist organization while Hizbullah claimed that it was not.  Hizbullah was similar to 
an American political party where the act of one member of Congress does not 
necessarily represent the opinion of the whole party.  There are actually many parallels to 
be drawn between Hizbullah and the Northern Irish political party Sinn Fein.  Sinn Fein 
is closely allied with the Irish Republican Army (IRA).  While the IRA is known to 
commit acts of violence, Sinn Fein claims to be solely a political party.  The ties between 
the IRA and Sinn Fein are similar to the ties between Hizbullah and Islamic militant 
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groups.  As Robert Baer, a former CIA operative in Beirut, said, “I don’t agree that 
Hizbullah itself is a terrorist organization.  It delivers powdered milk; it takes care of 
people.  It’s a social organization; it’s a political organization.  It fights corruption.”198
The majority of ideologues within Hizbullah see themselves as Lebanese nationalists 
first, and Islamists second.199  They include Christians in their Parliament delegations and 
the ranks of the Hizbullah fighters.  “There are two faces of Hizbullah today.  There’s the 
Lebanese political and social-welfare party, and there’s the guerrilla group involved in a 
struggle with Israel,” said Farid el-Khazen, chairman of the political science department 
at the American University of Beirut in 2002.200
c. The Lebanese Government and Hizbullah
The Lebanese government supported Hizbullah at great cost to the nation’s 
infrastructure and economy.  It supported Hizbullah under the premise that its military 
presence would cease once Israel stopped the occupation of Southern Lebanon.  The 
government turned against the SLA (South Lebanon Army) with the Parliament publicly 
confirming that membership in the SLA was a treasonable offense.  In 1989, SLA 
members, in abstentia, were sentenced to life in prison for collaboration with Israel.  
Antoine Lahad, the SLA commander, was sentenced to death (again in abstentia) for 
committing acts of treason and for collaborating with Israel.
Events in Iran and the establishment of peace in Lebanon led Hizbullah to avoid
intra-Shia combat and to turn to electoral politics as a means of promoting Islam.    The 
Shia resented the fact that in spite of Muslim sects surpassing Christian sects in 
population growth, they had not received the comparable share of political influence 
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required by Lebanon’s confessional system.  Under confessionalism leadership positions 
and jobs are proportioned on a quota system.  Each sect gets a certain amount of jobs 
based on its actual numbers in the community.  Although Hizbullah saw the confessional 
system as unequal, it was the only way for it to gain power.  Thus the Shia participated in 
the 1989 Ta’if Agreements.  Article 24 of the agreements called for proportional 
representation among the confessional groups within each religious community.  Article 
44 granted increased powers to the Shiite position of Speaker of the House.  Article 49 
reduced the position of the Maronite President to essentially a symbolic one.  Article 95 
established a committee to work towards the eventual abolition of the confessional 
system.201  The Shia saw this plan as a middle road between acquiescence and 
radicalization.  The 1989 Ta’if agreement changed Hizbullah from a total anti-system 
movement to a protest organization.  
In 1992, Hizbullah entered the political scene thus showing that it was no longer 
solely dependent upon its military reputation.  That year it took seven of 128 seats (6%) 
and eight in 1996 (7%).202  While Hizbullah had believed that the government of Amine 
Gemayel was allied with Israel and thus felt that it needed to be stopped, the regime of 
Rafiq al-Hariri was not oppressive enough to warrant destruction.  In 1992 and 1995 
Hizbullah members of Parliament voted no confidence in Hariri.  In the next elections 
Hizbullah abstained from voting.  This shows a trend towards greater participation and 
confidence in the Lebanese democratic system.
Former Prime Minister of Lebanon and a Sunni Muslim, Salim al-Hoss said of 
Hizbullah’s participation in Parliament, 
“They have been very active in parliament.  It is distinguished from other parties 
in the fact that the dealings with people are in general morally upright…Hizbullah 
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has shown that it is in total harmony with itself and in its position of opposition to 
the government in general.  Its stance on the various issues debated in parliament 
is also clear and united…Despite our disagreement over this ideology [of the 
creation of an Islamic state], we consider that Hizbullah has the right to a political 
role within a democratic framework in order for it to achieve any goal that it 
adopts.”203
Hizbullah has formed electoral alliances with non-Islamists, suggesting that a 
range of political groups, including Islamists, is gaining experience in pluralist political 
practices.
d. Hizbullah and Foreign Nations
Israel
March 15, 1978, Israel invaded south Lebanon in order to liquidate the terrorist 
bases along the Israeli-Lebanese border.  The invasion left hundreds dead, 220,000 
homeless and 600 square kilometers of Lebanese territory occupied as a “security zone” 
governed by de facto Israeli control.  The term “security zone” was a euphemism to 
conceal the illegal occupation of southern Lebanon.
Benjamin Netanyahu came to power in 1996 amidst Lebanese demands that Israel 
adhere to the 1978 UN Resolution 425 which called for withdrawal from southern 
Lebanon.  Israel, however, proceeded to make demands itself.  It claimed that it would 
not withdraw until Hizbullah was terminated, and it wanted the guarantee of safety for its 
proxy militia, the South Lebanon Army.  Israel wanted the SLA to be incorporated into 
Lebanese army.
In 2000, Israel agreed to withdraw from Lebanon, signaling the first Arab 
“victory” over Israel in the region.  There is contestation as to whether there has been a 
full withdrawal as the Israelis still remained in the Shab’a farms, a 25 square kilometer 
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area consisting of fourteen farms located at the corner where Syria, Lebanon and Israel 
meet.  Israel also did not liberate the remaining 19 Lebanon prisoners held in Israeli jails.  
Once the Lebanese government declared the withdrawal incomplete, Hizbullah was given 
a new lease on life.  They commenced attacks on the Shab’a farms, which also served 
Syrian purposes as they were negotiating a peace deal with Israel over the Golan Heights 
and were hoping to gain leverage with claiming they could stop the violence.  The 
violence also indirectly helped the Palestinian cause because it destabilized the Israeli 
regime.
Hizbullah not only dislikes the Israeli government because of its occupation of 
Palestine, but also because Israel actually invaded its territory.  The animosity towards 
Israel is not simply an ideological clash between a Muslim nation and a Jewish state, but 
rather the animosity of a nation whose sovereignty was violated by the invasion of a 
foreign entity.
Palestine
Hizbullah has an interesting relationship with the Palestinians.  The Palestinians 
saw southern Lebanon as a staging ground for the freedom of Lebanon and the entire 
Arab world.  Thus the Palestinians went into southern Lebanon in order to stage attacks 
on Israel across the border.  This led to the Israeli invasion of 1978.  While the southern 
Lebanese welcomed the Palestinians at first, they quickly tired of their presence.  The 
Palestinians proved as much of a nuisance as the Israelis.
Hizbullah, however, does support the creation of a Palestinian state.  Its attack on 
the Israelis in the Shab’a farms was meant to show support for the Palestinian cause.  The 
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Hizbullah forces had captured three Israeli soldiers and a retired Israeli colonel, claiming 
they would release the four Israelis if 1,600 Arabs, mostly Palestinians, were released 
from prison.  Thus while Hizbullah did not support the PLO’s presence in southern 
Lebanon, it was still willing to support its cause.
Hizbullah has separated the occupation of southern Lebanon from the issue of 
Israeli control of Jerusalem.  It feels that armed resistance was the only way to help the 
southern Lebanese, but Jerusalem is an issue to be taken up by the Palestinians.204
Iran
Iran’s influence on Hizbullah was significant in the initial stages.  Hizbullah was 
mainly an Iranian creation as Iran wanted to mobilize the Shia to fight the United States.  
Iran provided political, financial, logistical and military support, which proved very 
important to developing Hizbullah.  It also sent 1,500 Revolutionary Guards to Biqa after 
the 1982 invasion.  Hizbullah was dependent upon its sponsor, as it got military supplies 
via Syria from Iran.  The relaxation of hostility towards the West as urged by the current 
President Khatami has proved influential to the movement as well. 
Syria
“With the collapse of the Soviet bloc, Lebanon has the unhappy distinction today of being the only satellite 
state in the world.”205
Since the 1970s, Damascus has succeeded in implementing an incremental yet 
systematic policy of occupation over Lebanon that has transformed the political, social, 
and economic character of the country. The Syrian occupation was completed in 1990 
with the removal of General (and Prime Minister) Michel Aoun from the Ba'abda 
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presidential palace and with the full conquest of Beirut the capital.  Syrian dictator Hafez 
Assad has violated numerous resolutions calling for the withdrawal of Syria from 
Lebanon.  Most notably he has violated Arab summit resolutions including the October 
1978 Riyadh/Cairo agreements, the Fez agreements of September 1982, and the October 
1989 Ta’if agreements, which called for the total evacuation of the Syrian army by 1991. 
Assad does not recognize Lebanese sovereignty.  In fact, Lebanon does not appear on 
official Syrian maps, but rather is part of "Greater Syria," which also includes Israel.
On August 8, 1973, Assad declared his intentions of annexing Lebanon by 
announcing that, “Lebanon and Syria are one country and one people, but have two 
governments.”206  Syria began its invasion in 1973 by supporting the Syrian-Palestinian 
militia group Saheka as they attacked villages in Northern Lebanon.  In May of 1976, the 
Syrian army invaded the Lebanese northern region of Akkar and advanced into the Bekaa 
valley.  By the end of 1976, the Syrian troops in Lebanon were estimated to be around 
25,000; 1 solider for every 100 Lebanese citizens.207  The League of Arab Nations 
attempted to send peacekeeping troops to Lebanon, but in the following year they were 
forced to leave by the Syrian troops.  On September 9, 1983, the Lebanese government 
made a desperate plea for help to the UN and the European governments claiming that 
the Syrian and the Palestinian forces were fighting to bring down the legal government of 
Lebanon.  Throughout the late 1980s Syria continued to try to interfere in the government 
of Lebanon, attempting to control elections in the areas it occupied.  
On October 13, 1990, Syrian troops launched aerial and ground attacks on 
Lebanon, occupying the Lebanese presidential palace and the ministry of defense.  Syria 
was able to do this as the rest of the world was preoccupied with the Iraqi invasion of 
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Kuwait.  The Syrian regime appointed its own proxy government and president in 
occupied Lebanon and started a large-scale persecution operation against the Lebanese 
people.  At this point Syria occupied more than 90% of the country, including the capital, 
the airport, the harbors and all major cities.  The puppet government of Lebanon amended 
the Lebanese constitution and drew several agreements with the Syrian regime providing 
it with huge benefits including the use of Lebanese natural resources.  The Lebanese 
community began a peaceful revolution to implement the 1982 UN Resolution 520
calling for the complete Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon.  
In the year 2000 Israel withdrew from South Lebanon according to UN 
Resolution 425.  The Syrian regime, however, tried to bring a conflict between the UN 
and Israel over the Shab’a farmland.  The Syrian regime was attempting to strategically 
create tension between Lebanon and Israel in order to divert the calls for Syrian 
withdrawal.  By 2003, approximately 30,000 Syrian troops and 25,000 intelligence 
members were deployed in Lebanon; 1 Syrian solider for every 50 Lebanese citizens.208
The Syrians have committed numerous human rights violations in their 
occupation as documented by groups such as the US State Department, Amnesty 
International, Human Rights Watch, and others.  The Syrians are guilty of illegal 
wiretapping, unlawful detentions and incarcerations, arrests without probable cause, 
arbitrary prison sentences, torture and disappearances.  The occupation has also had 
devastating effects on the political system as the Syrians have tampered with every 
Lebanese election since their occupation was completed in 1990.  
The economy has been ruined since the Syrians took control.  The national debt, 
which was less than $1 billion in 1990, has swelled to nearly $22 billion at the close of 
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the decade.  The government has progressively increased taxes in order to cover its debt.  
Any profit to be made is gained by the top 1%, those allied with Syria.  This money is 
hardly ever spent in Lebanon.  The Syrians have also supported a colonization plan in 
which Syrian citizens are moving to Lebanon, working and sending the profit back to 
Syria.  These workers are undocumented and thus not responsible for taxes.  They are 
creating a huge drain on the Lebanese economy.
The Lebanese freedom of speech has also been greatly inhibited.  Beirut was once 
one of the centers for free expression in the Arab world; however, the Syrian occupation 
has greatly reduced this freedom.  Once the occupation was completed the Syrians began 
control of the media.  In 1996 the controversial Media Law was passed which essentially 
destroyed free expression in the country; 52 television stations were cut to 4, and 100 
radio stations to 11, only three of which were permitted to broadcast news programs.209
Syrian occupation employed a wide range of policy means to transform Lebanon 
into a "client state" and a Syrian political satellite. By means of military control and 
political penetration, media repression and alien colonization, Lebanon has lost its 
independence.  Many feel that the Syrian presence in Lebanon has actually helped to 
contain simmering conflicts between Lebanese groups and perhaps even prevented 
another civil war.  The Lebanese, however, do not buy this argument.  They want the 
withdrawal of Syrian troops.  The presence of Syrian troops is viewed as an affront to 
sovereignty and is despised by Hizbullah and the government as a whole.  
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The West
In 1985, Hizbullah sent an open letter to a daily newspaper vowing holy war 
against the Israelis and the Christian forces connected with them, as well as their Western 
supporters.  After a disastrous intervention, the US prevented the UN from taking any 
action in Lebanon that would be contrary to Israeli interests.  It even pushed aside French 
and Western European attempts at intervention.  Instead the US tried to exert influence 
through Egypt and the Gulf Oil states.  Hizbullah managed to get the US out of Lebanon 
on Dec 2, 1988.  This was heralded as a major Arab victory.
Subsequent US administrations have handled the Lebanon situation poorly.  The 
government has been loath to address the Syrian issue.  The Clinton administration never 
specifically called for Syrian troops to withdraw.  Instead it opted for the more vague 
withdrawal of “all foreign forces”.
The addition of Hizbullah to the Global Terrorist Watch List under President 
George W. Bush was more of an Ariel Sharon initiative than a reflection of the global 
war on terror.  Hizbullah had not attacked US interests in 15 years.  In the interim it had 
been resisting Israel’s invasion of southern Lebanon.  Would-be allies in the global war 
on terror were outraged at the addition of Hizbullah and the adoption of the Israeli point 
of view by the United States.  American University of Beirut political scientist Nizar 
Hamzeh said that this decision was, “a major strategic mistake.”210  The US needed the 
crucial support of Arab allies.  It needed to understand the complexities of the Israel 
situation rather than seeking simple solutions.  Instead of at least distinguishing between 
the political and military wings of Hizbullah, the White House appeared as if it were 
doing the bidding of Israel.
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Hizbullah points out the double standards of the West.  The West rushed to the 
defense of Salman Rushdie when the Iranian Ayatollah issued a fatwa against him for his 
book criticizing Islam.  However, when French scholar Roger Garaudy wrote a book 
claiming that the number of Jews killed in World War II was far less than the 
conventional six million estimates, he was condemned worldwide and prosecuted by the 
French.  They point to that fact that Israel has the capability to make biological and 
chemical weapons, yet the US takes action against Iraq.  It is an even further irony that 
the US had given Hussein the weapons in the first place.  The US also supports regimes 
in Iraq, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Egypt that deny 
democracy to their citizens.  How can the US extol the virtues of democracy when it will 
not even support it abroad?
Hizbullah also points out that the US is acting against the UN’s Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the UN Charter by labeling Hizbullah as a terrorist 
organization when they were simply protecting themselves against foreign encroachment, 
a right enshrined in both.  The Americans have been quick to blame Hizbullah for acts of 
terror worldwide, such as the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing which was really committed 
by an American.
A critique of Western culture by the Hizbullah Student Mobilization Unit claims, 
“Western proposals must be studied in depth by the Muslim student so that he will be 
able to extract the truths they contain while refuting their subjective assumptions.”211
This implies that the two cultures can be reconciled by discovering the truths in both.  
Hizbullah supports the American notion of free expression and social equality.  It admires 
Western scientific knowledge and feels that its education system is better than the system 
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of the Arab world.  Many party members went to the West to be educated for college and 
graduate programs.  The party describes itself as the “banner of change” or the 
“progressive party”.212  Unlike the traditionalists in Algeria, it even supports the use of 
satellite dishes to help the public gain access to information from around the world.
Hizbullah Deputy Secretary-General Sheikh Na’im Qasim said, “What we do now 
is fight Israel on our land.  We support the Palestinian struggle but in no specific way.  
We do not fight against the US.  Even our struggle against Israel never went beyond 
Lebanon’s legitimate border.”213  The West allying itself with Israel in the global war on 
terrorism has led it to lose Muslim allies.  As a State Department official commented, 
“We might as well be printing recruiting posters for bin Laden.”214  If the US does not 
step up and realize that Hizbullah is a powerful political force in the region, not simply a 
terrorist organization, it will lose a valuable ally in the region.
e. Hizbullah Terrorism?
Yitzhak Rabin once commented that the Shiites had the potential “for a kind of 
terrorism that we had not yet experienced.  If, as a result of the war in Lebanon, we 
replace PLO terrorism with Shiite terrorism we have done the worst thing in our struggle 
against terrorism.”215
Hizbullah is known to have ties to Al Qaeda.  Lebanon, in fact, has been a refuge 
for Al Qaeda operatives who are assisted by the League of Partisans, a Palestinian 
Lebanon-based Sunni Muslim militia.  This group has been linked to Takfir wa al-Hijra a 
fundamentalist Boston taxi driver who was friends with another Boston cabbie linked to 
the September 11th attacks.  Al-Hijra launched a failed uprising in northern Lebanon 
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seeking to establish an Islamic mini-state that would eventually encompass the entire 
country.  He gained funding from bin Laden and bought his weapons from the former 
Hizbullah Secretary General Shaykh Subhi al-Tufayli, who resigned over the 1992 
elections.  The Lebanese Defense Minister admits that there are some Al Qaeda 
operatives that have come into Lebanon but claims that they have been dealt with in 
conjunction with American, French, German, Arab and Syrian leaders.
There are important distinctions to be made between Hizbullah and Osama bin 
Laden.  Hizbullah is an Islamic nationalist movement.  It seeks to give Islam a greater 
voice in existing nations states and to rid the region of the US and Israel.  Hizbullah does 
not seek to create a global Islamic network and society like bin Laden does.
f. Conclusions
“Theirs was a society in transition, a blend of the old and the new, of tradition and modernity, East 
and West.”216
As long as the West and Israel continue to regard the Hizbullah problem as a 
crusade against terrorism, they are in effect denying their own responsibility in creating 
the problem in the first place. 
An excerpt from the Hearing on the future of Lebanon before the subcommittee 
on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the committee on Foreign Relations of the 
United States Senate claims,
“We do need to stand up for democracy for the people of Lebanon and for the 
people of Syria; for an end to occupation for Lebanon; and above all, we need to 
stand for the disarmament of terrorist groups like Hizbullah, who do nothing more 
than exploit the people of Lebanon for the benefit of extremists in Damascus and 
in Tehran.”217
118
This shows that the United States still recognizes Hizbullah as a terrorist organization and 
refuses to at least separate its militant wing from its political wing.  Hizbullah has gone 
through a significant metamorphosis since its creation.  What started as a militant 
movement against foreign invasion has turned into a viable political movement.  
Hizbullah has proved itself willing to participate in the Lebanese democratic process.  It 
has even reassured Westerners that it is not seeking to impose an Iranian-style Islamic 
state.  Hizbullah draws a clear distinction between the practical level in which it supports 
democracy as the best form of governance, and the intellectual level in which an Islamic 
state is ideal.  The multireligious nature of the state will not create the opportunity to 
impose an Islamic state and Hizbullah recognizes this.  
Many of Hizbullah’s community rebuilding projects sit well with the notion of 
democracy.  The new Bush Jr. administration should be careful about who is labeled as a 
terrorist and who is not.  In this new world it is very important for the United States to 
have Muslim allies, especially in the Arab world, and Lebanon could prove a valuable 
one.  The arbitrary labeling of “terrorist”, however, will impede this process.  While the 
images of US Marines being blown to pieces in Beirut still resonate with the current 
policymakers, the US must move past this and attempt to see Hizbullah as a new political 
force, not a terrorist organization.
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Chapter 7: Final Thoughts
Since the end of the Cold War American foreign policymakers have struggled to 
define policy in a new world order.  Unfortunately, the United States government has not 
yet been able to escape the Cold War mentality and thus foreign policy is still tainted by 
the race against the Soviet Union.  The Cold War of the Millennium is the war of 
democracy and Western values against Islam.  The examples of Algeria, Indonesia and 
Lebanon have shown that these nations embrace democracy while still retaining their 
Islamic character proving that there is not a fundamental existential crisis in this conflict, 
but rather that the clash is coming from other sources.  One of the main problems has 
been the foreign policy of Western nations towards these states.   Western states watched 
idly as the Algerian democratic process was overrun by a military dictatorship.  The 
Lebanese are constantly hurt by the close alliance of the United States and Israel.  
Indonesia, the most successful example, has succeeded primarily because the Western 
nations have not paid it much attention.   With the advent of the global war on terror it is 
becoming increasingly important to gain the support of Muslim nations.  Each of these 
nations has reached out to the United States at one point or another.  Even Hizbullah has 
claimed that it would like to form a rapport with the United States as long as it is willing 
to moderate its blind support of Israel.  With these nations reaching out to the US, the US 
must change its views towards the Muslim world before it loses their valuable support in 
the war on terror.
One main way to do this is by reevaluating the Palestine issue.  The plight of the 
Palestinians is a plight felt by Muslims worldwide.  Algeria and Lebanon have 
specifically expressed their support for the displaced Muslims.  Indonesia has decided to 
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take a more neutral view.  While it does support the creation of a Palestinian state, it has 
not taken any definitive action towards helping the Palestinians.  The Indonesians regard 
the Middle East and its problems as being far away from the concerns of the nation, both 
geographically and practically.  
These nations have also all supported the Muslims in Bosnia.  Islamist groups 
within each nation sent troops and support to the Bosnians.  They, however, did not claim 
to be doing this in the name of fighting the West, but rather in the name of supporting an 
oppressed people.  It is important to note that none of these nations have attempted to 
form a global Islamist network, as Osama bin Laden envisions.  Indonesia, the largest 
Muslim nation in the world and the third largest democracy, has never made any such 
attempt.  Instead Indonesia has attempted to become a leader of the Group of 77, an 
organization of third world nations encompassing multi-ethnic and multireligious states.  
Thus even though they have lent support to the Bosnians and the Palestinians, these 
nations are not planning a global uprising against the West.
It is also important to realize that nations of the Muslim world are newly 
independent.  All of the nations studied gained independence in the twentieth century: 
Algeria in 1962, Indonesia 1945, and Lebanon 1944.  The plight of the people that led to 
the resurgence of the Islamist movement is the same experience that peoples the world 
over have had.  After independence, economic strife led to rapid urbanization.  As the 
Muslims found themselves living in slums confronted with the wealth of the elite, they 
began to become restless.  Young men were left with nothing to do while the economies 
of these nations floundered.  As they were searching for a sense of identity, they were 
confronted by the ideas of Islamist leaders and thus a new generation supporting Islam 
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was created.  Once these movements had gained power, they began to reevaluate the 
worth of a democratic system.  
The Islamist movements in all these nations were able to support the population 
charitably, providing the poor with hospitals, schools, healthcare, jobs, etc.  They 
recognized the plight of the dispossessed and sought to alleviate the situation.  The 
Islamists also realized that this sense of charity could resonate well with the democratic 
principles of equality and human rights.  
The failure of democracy in Algeria was not due to an ideological clash between 
Islam and the West, but rather practical factors.  The swift changes in 1988 were not 
accompanied by an improved understanding of the mechanisms permitting political 
pluralism to function effectively. The fact that the regime attempted political and 
economic reform simultaneously in part led to democracy’s failure.  The government was 
not prepared to meet the increased demands of the people.  There was competition 
between the regime’s short-run economic goals and its long-run political objectives.  
There was not enough time between the legalization of political parties and the elections 
themselves.  The failure was also due to the fact that the elites were divided on the issues 
of democracy and liberalization.  Today the lack of openness in the political system 
remains the main obstacle to the formation of a cohesive Islamic party in the current 
Algerian state.  The moderate Islamists base their goals on the electoral system, from 
which they are currently excluded.  Due to the lack of political opportunity there is no 
way for the Islamists to support political democracy in Islam.  With the situation as it is 
today only armed conflict can result.  
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Democracy in Indonesia is still a rather nascent concept, but has been relatively 
successful.  Demands for democracy came in the midst of economic crisis in the Suharto 
regime.  The first democratic elections were held on June 7, 1999.  Abdurrhaman Wahid 
came to power, a theologian who felt that there needed to be a separation of religion and 
politics.  He advocated Islam as an internal cultural dictate, while democracy was the best 
solution for the country’s political problems.  Wahid’s regime, however, was plagued by 
violence. Uprisings in the Malukus and Sulawesi, for example, served to make him 
appear ineffective.  Today it is thought that the Islamist groups that perpetrated this 
violence were supported by members of the former Suharto regime.  These members 
sought to disrupt the regime and bring the military back to power.  Amidst scandal Wahid 
resigned, and Vice President Megawati assumed power.  Megawati is still attempting to 
court the support of Muslims and thus has not taken severe action against Muslim 
extremist groups.  Although Indonesia is still testing the waters, the elections have gone 
off relatively well.  The third largest democracy can prove to be an example for the rest 
of the Muslim world.
Lebanon is an interesting example.  The verdict is not yet out as to whether it will 
be a successful country with the incorporation of Hizbullah as a valid Islamist party.  
While it had pursued violence in the 1980s as it was fighting the Israeli incursion into 
southern Lebanon, today Hizbullah has changed its tactics.  What started as a militant 
movement against foreign invasion has turned into a viable political movement.  
Hizbullah joined the electoral process in 1992.  Thus far it has proved itself willing to 
participate in the Lebanese democratic process reassuring Westerners that it is not 
seeking to impose an Iranian-style Islamic state.  Hizbullah draws a clear distinction 
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between the practical level in which it supports democracy as the best form of 
governance, and the intellectual level in which an Islamic state is ideal.  Many of 
Hizbullah’s community rebuilding projects sit well with the notion of democracy.  In the 
post-war period the Lebanese economy has been devastated and Hizbullah has been very 
instrumental in trying to rebuild the country.
This is not to imply that Islam and the West can only get along if an Islamic 
nation is democratic.  The point of this entire exercise has been to prove that there is not a 
fundamental clash between the two cultures.  The Qur’an teaches that all religions are 
members of society.  In the Qur’an the umma can refer specifically to the community of 
believers, but it can also be extended to the entire world thus making the covenant of
Islam inclusive to all religions and nations.  We have seen this theory expressed by 
Muslim intellectuals such as Nurcholish Madjid of Indonesia.
 Surah 109: verse 6 of the Qur’an specifically says “To you your religion and to 
me mine”.  The Qur’an goes out of its way to ensure that special respect and treatment is 
given to the “People of the Book”, Jews and Christians, as the Prophet Mohammed is 
said to be a prophet in a long line of prophets deriving from these religions.
Unfortunately, the Western media has served to further the impression that Islam 
and the West must clash.  There has been recent tension over the word “jihad”.  In the 
media the word is used to mean a “holy war” pitting Muslims against Jews and 
Christians.  The truth of the matter is that there are two types of jihad: greater jihad, a 
personal spiritual struggle, and lesser jihad, a warfare form of struggle.  The former type 
of jihad is the one practiced by most Muslims as they attempt to adhere to the dictates of 
their religion.  However, it is the latter form that has gained much attention.  Lesser jihad 
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is meant to be a defensive struggle, protecting the Islamic community when it is 
threatened or invaded.  This term has been exploited by Islamic terrorists, such as Osama 
bin Laden, as well as by the Western media.  Jihad is not a struggle that is meant to be 
carried out against every American, but rather is a means of protecting the Islamic 
community against attack.  Thus both bin Laden and the media are wrong in viewing it as 
an offensive struggle against the infidels.
The number of Muslims living in America has been documented to be somewhere 
between 1 and 8 million (the US government does not ask for specific information about 
religion).  Regardless of whether the number is on the smaller side, the fact remains that 
these people have been able to incorporate themselves into Western society.  They are not 
on the street everyday clashing with Americans, but rather are living their lives 
peacefully.  The majority of the world’s 1.25 billion Muslims are peace loving.  They do 
not see an inevitable clash between Islam and the West.  Hizbullah, the most extreme of 
all the Islamist movements studied, has actually come out and stated that there is not a 
fundamental clash.  A critique of Western culture by the Hizbullah Student Mobilization 
Unit states, “Western proposals must be studied in depth by the Muslim student so that he 
will be able to extract the truths they contain while refuting their subjective 
assumptions.”222  This implies that the two cultures can be reconciled by discovering the 
truths in both.  Parts of each culture can resonate well with the other.
It is also important to remember that globally there has been an increase in 
fundamentalism of all religions, not just Islam.  The Christian Right in the United States 
has gained considerable power in the past few decades.  As the country comes to grapple 
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with issues such as abortion and gay marriage, the power of this group becomes 
increasing clear.   
There has also been an increase in Jewish fundamentalism in both Israel and the 
United States in the past quarter-century.  Jewish fundamentalists are centered on the 
concept of the Jewish homeland, believing that the resettlement of Zion will hasten the 
coming of the Messiah.  Jewish fundamentalists have been key players in the disputed 
settlement initiatives on Palestinian lands.  
It is interesting to note that all religions in their most extreme form seem to 
resemble one another.  All are seeking to return the world to an impossible past.  They 
seek to apply religious law to every nation, discriminating against other religions and 
strictly forbidding intermarriage.  In all fundamentalist movements women are relegated 
to a lesser status.  The world would do well to focus on the rise of fundamentalism in 
general, rather than focusing only on Islamic fundamentalism.
It is this lack of distinction and understanding of global trends that hinders current 
US foreign policy.  The West must realize and embrace the uniqueness of all nations.  It 
is unrealistic to hold every nation to the same standards since all nations are not equal.  
Thus a “cookie cutter” foreign policy where all nations are expected to follow the same 
textbook path to development is not feasible.  The only way to foster successful 
international relationships is to incorporate the specific culture of each state.  The United 
States must not impose its own culture on the rest of the world, as is perceived by the 
Muslim states.  
Today the United States has isolated itself from practically every other nation in 
the world. As we attempt to fight the global war on terror it will become increasingly 
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more difficult without the support of other states.  It is simply unrealistic to believe that 
the United States is capable of running the world on its own.  While terrorism should of 
course be a concern of the West as well as of the region, it is important that labels such as 
“terrorism” and “fundamentalism” be carefully examined before they push the United 
States into strong stands against movements, which are actually vying for national 
sovereignty.  
The struggle over a definition of terrorism is not merely a US issue.  Thus far 
there have been thirteen UN Conventions on Terrorism and yet the UN has not developed 
a specific definition of terrorism.  There have been many issues as to what truly 
constitutions an act of terrorism.  For example, there are questions as to whether or not 
military personnel can be held accountable for acts of terrorism. Some countries, like the 
US, argue that military behavior needs to be judged according to other standards of 
international law, namely, the laws of war and the Geneva Conventions. There have also 
been disputes as to whether there is a difference between the terms “terrorist” and 
“freedom fighter.”  Until the United Nations is able to develop a definition there can be 
no further progress made in combating terrorism.  
That said the United States should change its focus from labeling nations as 
terrorist, to attempting to help countries overcome the difficulties of modernization and 
democratization.  The United States needs to consider the young who are a large portion 
of the Muslim population and without direction.  In poorer Muslim nations there simply 
is not enough work for these people and thus they are left unemployed and without 
direction.  Members of this demographic from both rich and poor countries are 
increasingly turning towards fundamentalism to provide direction.  The United States 
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must seriously focus on incorporating these people into society and giving them a voice 
and direction before more people turn towards fundamentalism as an answer to their 
problems.
Today the United States should adopt a “new domino theory” of foreign relations 
in which it will sacrifice to get as many nations on its side- the side of the global 
community.  The war on terror and violence in general, will be put to an end once all the 
nations of the world can come together in a common forum and cooperate for the greater 
good.  There is not a fundamental existential clash between Islam and the West, but until 
US policymakers and the public in general realize this there will be conflict.    
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